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Abstract
We study the complexity of deciding the existence of mixed equilibria for minimization
games where players use valuations other than expectation to evaluate their costs. We
consider risk-averse players seeking to minimize the sum V = E+ R of expectation E and a
risk valuation R of their costs; R is non-negative and vanishes exactly when the cost incurred
to a player is constant over all choices of strategies by the other players. In a V-equilibrium,
no player could unilaterally reduce her cost.
Say that V has theWeak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property if all strategies supported
in a player’s best-response mixed strategy incur the same conditional expectation of her cost.
We introduce E-strict concavity and observe that every E-strictly concave valuation has the
Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property. We focus on a broad class of valuations shown
to have the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property, which we exploit to prove two main
complexity results, the first of their kind, for the two simplest cases of the problem:
• Two strategies: Deciding the existence of a V-equilibrium is strongly NP-hard for
the restricted class of player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links [22], when
choosing R as (1) Var (variance), or (2) SD (standard deviation), or (3) a concave linear
sum of even moments of small order.
• Two players: Deciding the existence of a V-equilibrium is strongly NP-hard when
choosing R as (1) γ · Var, or (2) γ · SD, where γ > 0 is the risk-coefficient, or choosing
V as (3) a convex combination of E+ γ ·Var and the concave ν-valuation ν−1(E(ν(·))),
where ν(x) = xr, with r ≥ 2. This is a concrete consequence of a general strong NP-
hardness result that only needs the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property and a
few additional properties for V; its proof involves a reduction with a single parameter,
which can be chosen efficiently so that each valuation satisfies the additional properties.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Pros and Cons of Expectation
In a game, each player is using a mixed strategy, a probability distribution over her strategies;
her cost depends on the choices of all players and is evaluated by a valuation: a function from
probability distributions to reals. The most prominent valuation in Non-Cooperative Game
Theory is expectation; each player minimizes her expected cost.
A drawback of expectation is that it may not accomodate risk and its impact on strategic
decision; this inadequacy of expectation was addressed as early as 1738 by Bernoulli [4]. Indeed,
risk-averse players [1] are willing to accept a larger amount of payment rather than gambling and
taking the risk of a larger cost; according to [15], “a risk-averse player is willing to pay something
for certainty”. So, valuations other than expectation have been sought (cf. [1, 10, 21, 27]).
Concave valuations, such as variance and standard deviation, are well-suited to model risk-
averse minimizing players. Already in 1906, Fisher [14] proposed attaching standard deviation
to expectation as an additive measure of risk.
In his seminal paper [21], Markowitz introduced the Mean-Variance approach to portfolio
maximization, advocating the minimization of variance constrained on some lower bound on the
expected return. This way, instead of a single optimal solution, a class of “efficient” solutions,
termed as the Efficient frontier [10], is defined, incurring the lowest risk for a given level of
expected return. Popular valuations for determining a single maximizing solution from the
Efficient frontier are (i) E − γ · Var, where E and Var stand for expectation and variance,
respectively, and γ > 0 describes the risk tolerance (see [10]), and (ii) the Sharpe Ratio SR =
E/SD [27], where SD stands for standard deviation. The Mean-Variance paradigm [21] created
Modern Portfolio Theory [10] as a new field and initiated a tremendous amount of research —
see the surveys [20, 28] for an overview. However, in the Mean-Variance paradigm [21], only
expectation and variance were used for evaluating the return; this choice is justified only if the
return is normally distributed [17]. Subsequently this inadequacy led to risk models involving
higher moments so as to accomodate returns with a more general distribution [19].
We now switch back to the minimization setting. A significant advantage of expectation
is that it guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium [24, 25], where each player is playing
a best-response mixed strategy and could not unilaterally reduce her expected cost. Existence
of equilibria (for minimization games) extends to convex valuations [8, 11], but may fail for
non-convex and even for concave ones. Crawford’s game [7, Section 4] was the first counterex-
ample game with no equilibrium for a certain valuation; for more counterexamples, see [9, 22].
The view that mixed equilibria get “endangered” in games where players are not expectation-
optimizers has been put forward in [7] and adopted further in [12, 22].
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Fiat and Papadimitriou [12] introduced the equilibrium computation problem in games
where risk-averse players use valuations more general than expectation, and addressed the com-
plexity of deciding the existence of such equilibria.∗ Subsequently, Mavronicolas and Monien [22]
focused on the concave valuation expectation plus variance, for which they established struc-
tural and complexity results for their introduced class of player-specific scheduling games [22,
Section 3]; their results provided a solid basis for the study of more general concave valuations.
1.2 Valuations More General than Expectation
In this work, we shall consider minimization games. We model the valuation of each player as
the sum V = E + R, where E and R are the expectation and risk valuation, respectively. The
formulation of (E + R)-valuations draws motivation from the Mean-Variance paradigm [21],
and from the Variance Principle and the Standard Deviation Principle, two standard premium
principles in Actuarial Risk Theory (cf. [18, Section 5.3]), by which V = E + γ · Var (resp.,
V = E+γ ·SD), where γ > 0 is the risk-coefficient. We focus on the associated decision problem,
denoted as ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM, asking, given a game G, whether G has a V-equilibrium, where no
player could unilaterally reduce her cost (as evaluated by V). What is the impact of properties
of V on the complexity of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM?†
We stipulate a very basic property for R, called Risk-Positivity: the value of R is non-
negative, en par with the Non-negative Loading property of the premium principles in [18,
Section 5.3.1]; it is 0, yielding no risk, exactly when the cost incurred to a player is constant
over all choices of strategies by the other players.
We shall focus on concave valuations. A key property of a concave valuation, called Optimal-
Value, we prove and exploit is that it maintains the same optimal value over all convex com-
binations of strategies supported in a given best-response mixed strategy (Proposition 3.1).
Unfortunately, unlike Var, moments of order higher than 2 are not concave. But on the positive
side, all even moments have the Risk-Positivity property. Besides, recent work in Portfolio
Theory [19] motivates using higher moments to model risk.
To obtain an enhanced class of interesting concave valuations, we introduce into the context
of equilibrium computation valuations prominent for evaluating risk in Actuarial Risk Theory,
which are transferred from the Mean Value Principle (see [18, Section 5.3]). Specifically, we
shall consider ν-valuations of the form Vν = ν−1(E(ν(·))), for any increasing and strictly convex
∗The work in [12] considered the dual setting where risk-averse players maximize non-concave valuations; they
focused on the convex valuation expectation minus variance.
†Strictly speaking, some of the considered properties of V are rather properties of the equilibria of some game
G whose players minimize V. For ease of presentation, we shall omit reference to G since G will be either fixed
or clear from context in the settings we shall consider, so that the property depends only on V.
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function ν, so that ν−1 is concave.‡ It is good news that for ν increasing and strictly convex,
Rν := Vν − E has the Risk-Positivity property (Lemma 2.1); so, Vν is an (E+ R)-valuation.
1.3 Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation and E-Strict Concavity
As our main tool, we shall exploit the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property [22, Section
2.6]: all strategies supported in a player’s best-response mixed strategy induce the same con-
ditional expectation, taken over all random choices of the other players, for her cost; thus, the
player is holding a unique expectation for her cost no matter which of her supported strate-
gies she ends up choosing. This property holds vacuously for Nash equilibria [24, 25]. The
Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property formalizes the most natural intuition for the play-
ers’ expectations; hence, it is a very natural property to seek and employ in the setting of risk.
We aim at an enhanced class of valuations with theWeak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
We introduce an E-strictly concave valuation as a concave valuation which, viewed as a
function of a single mixed strategy, fulfills the definition of a strictly concave function for any
pair of mixed strategies inducing different expectations (Definition 2.2). We observe that a
convex combination of an E-strictly concave valuation and a concave valuation is E-strictly
concave (Corollary 2.2); furthermore, Var and SD are E-strictly concave (Lemma 2.3). Hence, a
wide class of concrete instances of E-strictly concave valuations results by plugging in the convex
combination (i) E+γ ·Var for an E-strictly concave valuation, with γ > 0, and (ii) a ν-valuation,
with an increasing and strictly convex function ν, for a concave valuation (Corollary 2.4). We
establish the key fact that every E-strictly concave valuation has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-
Expectation property (Proposition 3.2). E-strictly concave valuations make the largest subclass
of concave valuations we know of with the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
An obstacle to extending the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property to moments of
order higher than 2 is their non-concavity. Instead we consider concave linear sums of even
moments. (Even order is needed to guarantee the Risk-Positivity property.) We use the
Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) to establish that such concave valuations have the
Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property (Corollary 3.4); this property renders such concave
linear sums of even moments sufficiently interesting to consider.
1.4 Complexity Results for More General Valuations
By exploiting the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for an (E + R)-valuation V, we
shall show the strong NP-hardness of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM for the two simplest cases: games with
‡For the special case ν(x) = ex, Vν corresponds to the moment generating function (cf. [18, Section 2.4]) and
has gained special attention as the Exponential Principle premium in Actuarial Risk Theory [18, Section 5.3].
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two strategies and games with two players; these are the first complexity results for deciding
the existence of equilibria in the context of risk-modeling valuations (cf. Section 1.5).
1.4.1 Two Strategies
We discover that the complexity of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is captured by player-specific scheduling
games on two ordered links [22, Section 5.2.2], where the cost of player i on a link ℓ she chooses
is a sum of weights ω(i, i′, ℓ), each corresponding to player i, link ℓ and a player i′ choosing
the same link.§ Two ordered links [22, Section 5.2.2] means that link 1 incurs less weight than
link 2 to a player due to another player choosing the same link unless both weights are 0. We
show that for an (E + R)-valuation V, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly NP-hard for the class of
player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links when R is (1) Var, or (2) SD, or (3) a
concave linear sum of even moments of order k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} (Theorem 4.6).
Instrumental to the proof of Theorem 4.6 is the key property we show that a concave linear
sum of even moments of order k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} enjoys the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors
property: each player i either is pure or has all of her neighbors (that is, players i′ with
ω(i, i′, 1) 6= 0) pure (Proposition 4.3). This property is a quantitative expression of the view that
mixed equilibria get “endangered” when players are not expectation-optimizers (cf. [7, 12, 22]).
The class of concave linear sum of even moments of order k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8} is the largest class
of valuations we were able to identify with the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property. We
conjecture that every concave linear sum of even moments enjoys the property.
1.4.2 Two Players
We show that ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly NP-hard when V is an (E + R)-valuation V with
the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property provided that there is a polynomial time com-
putable δ, 0 < δ ≤ 14, such that three additional conditions hold (Theorem 5.1); the requirement
that δ be polynomial time computable stems from the fact that δ enters the reduction as a pa-
rameter. The first two such conditions ((2/a) and (2/b)) stipulate a particular inequality and a
particular monotonicity property, respectively. The third condition (2/c) refers to the Crawford
game GC(δ), a generalization of a bimatrix game from [7, Section 4], whose bimatrix involves
δ; it is required that GC(δ) has no V-equilibrium. The game GC(δ) is used as a “gadget” in
the reduction. The proof of Theorem 5.1, involving a reduction with a single parameter δ, is
§In the well-known model of weighted congestion games with player-specific latency functions [23], each
weighted player may use a different, player-specific cost function of the total weight on her selected link; in
this model, it is the weights that are player-specific, while each cost function is the identity one.
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very general since it refers to no particular valuation but to a class of valuations enjoying two
natural properties, Risk-Positivity and Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation.
Concrete strong NP-hardness results follow as instantiations of Theorem 5.1 for three par-
ticular valuations (1) V = E+γ ·Var, (2) V = E+γ ·SD, and (3) V = λ·(E+ γ · Var)+(1−λ)·Vν ,
with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν is the increasing and strictly convex function ν(x) = xr, with r ≥ 2,
and with γ > 0 (Theorem 5.12). For all three valuations in Theorem 5.12, we prove that the
three additional conditions in Theorem 5.1 hold. In particular, for Condition (2/c), we prove
that GC(δ) has no V-equilibrium for any value 0 < δ < 1; for the valuation (3), this holds in
the more general case ν is any increasing and strictly convex function (Lemma 5.11).
1.5 Summary, Significance and Related Work
For a concave valuation V, there may or may not exist a V-equilibrium; we have identified Vν ,
with an increasing and strictly convex function ν, as an example of a concave valuation V for
which every game has a V-equilibrium (cf. Section 5). However, restricting to a strictly concave
valuation excludes the existence of a mixed V-equilibrium. Restricting instead to an E-strictly
concave valuation V, a mixed V-equilibrium may or may not exist; what this work is revealing
is that it then becomes strongly NP-hard to decide if there is one already for the two simplest
cases, games with two strategies or two players (Theorems 4.6, 5.1 and 5.12).
While bringing concave valuations from Actuarial Risk Theory [18] into play, our framework
encompasses general classes of (E + R)-valuations, assuming the Risk-Positivity property, that
also enjoy theWeak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property, and a few additional properties. The
(E+ Var)-equilibria on which [12, 22] focused are a special case of our general framework.
Fiat and Papadimitriou [12, Theorem 5] presented a proof sketch to claim that it isNP-hard
to decide the existence of an (E + Var)-equilibrium for games with two players; unfortunately,
their proof had been flawed, containing several gaps and errors. In personal communication
with Fiat and Papadimitriou [13], they state: “The proof, as is, has gaps and errors, which we
believe can be fixed to yield a proof with the same architecture, but we have not done it yet.”
In lack of a proof, the complexity of deciding the existence of an (E + Var)-equilibrium for
games with two players has remained open, and Theorems 5.1 and 5.12 represent new results,
with Theorem 5.12 encompassing (E + Var)-equilibria as a special case. Our reduction adapts
techniques originally used by Conitzer and Sandholm [6, Section 3] to show that deciding the
existence of Nash equilibria with certain properties for games with two players is NP-complete.
Fiat and Papadimitriou [12, Section 2] coined a notion termed as strict concavity, denoted
here as FP-strict concavity, which is similar to but different than E-strict concavity. It turns
out that their difference is essential since E+Var is not FP-strictly concave while it is E-strictly
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concave.¶ In fact, no concrete example of an FP-strictly concave valuation was given in [12].
Fiat and Papadimitriou [12, Theorem 3 & Observation 4] proved the sparsity of mixed V-
equilibria, when V is FP-strictly concave: games with a mixed V-equilibrium have measure 0.
The sparsity of mixed (E+Var)-equilibria follows from [5, Theorem 1] where it is established that
(E+Var) is a Mean-Variance Preference Function [5, Claim 1].‖ Contrary to their sparsity, this
work establishes that deciding the existence of mixed (E+ Var)-equilibria is strongly NP-hard
(Theorems 4.6 and 5.12).
It was known that E + Var, as well as E + SD, have the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation
property [22, Theorem 3.5]; they were also known to have theMixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors
property for player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links [22, Theorem 5.13]. It was
established in [5, Theorem 4] that there is always a correlated equilibrium [2] for E+ Var.
1.6 Paper Organization
Section 2 presents the game-theoretic framework and introduces (E+R)-valuations and E-strict
concavity. Equilibria and their properties are articulated in Section 3. TheNP-hardness results
for two strategies and two players are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We conclude,
in Section 6, with a discussion of the results and some open problems.
2 Games, (E+ R)-Valuations and E-Strict Concavity
2.1 Games
For an integer n ≥ 2, an n-players game G, or game, consists of (i) n finite sets {Si}i∈[n] of
strategies, and (ii) n cost functions {µi}i∈[n], each mapping S = ×i∈[n]Si to the reals. So, µi(s)
is the cost of player i ∈ [n] on the profile s = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 of strategies, one per player.
A mixed strategy for player i ∈ [n] is a probability distribution pi on Si; the support of player
i in pi is the set σ(pi) = {ℓ ∈ Si | pi(ℓ) > 0}. Denote as ∆i = ∆(Si) the set of mixed strategies
for player i. Player i is pure if for each strategy si ∈ Si, pi(si) ∈ {0, 1}; else she is non-pure.
Denote as pℓi the pure strategy of player i choosing the strategy ℓ with probability 1.
A mixed profile is a tuple p = 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 of n mixed strategies, one per player; denote as
∆ = ∆(S) = ×i∈[n]∆i the set of mixed profiles. The mixed profile p induces probabilities p(s)
for each profile s ∈ S with p(s) = ∏i′∈[n] pi′(si′). For a player i ∈ [n], the partial profile s−i
(resp., partial mixed profile p−i) results by eliminating the strategy si (resp., the mixed strategy
¶See the Appendix for the definition of FP-strict concavity and a proof that E+Var is not FP-strictly concave.
‖See Section 3.4 for the definition of Mean-Variance Preference Functions and their relation to this work.
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pi) from s (resp., p). The partial mixed profile p−i induces probabilities p(s−i) for each partial
profile s−i ∈ S−i := ×i′∈[n]\{i}Si′ with p(s−i) =
∏
i′∈[n]\{i} pi′(si′).
A function V : T → R on a convex set T is concave (resp., strictly concave) if for any
two points t1, t2 ∈ T and any number δ ∈ [0, 1] (resp., δ ∈ (0, 1)), V(δ t1 + (1 − δ) t2) ≥
δ V(t1)+ (1− δ)V(t2) (resp., V(δ t1+(1− δ) t2) > δ V(t1)+ (1− δ)V(t2)). A function V : T→ R
on a convex set T is convex (resp., strictly convex) if −V is concave (resp., strictly concave).
2.2 (E+ R)-Valuations
For a player i ∈ [n], a valuation function, or valuation for short, Vi is a real-valued function on
∆(S), yielding a value Vi(p) to each mixed profile p, so that in the special case where p is a
profile s, Vi(s) = µi(s). A valuation V = 〈V1, . . . ,Vn〉 is a tuple of valuations, one per player;
GV denotes G together with V.∗∗ We now introduce a special class of valuations.
Definition 2.1 ((E+ R)-Valuation) An (E + R)-valuation is a valuation of the form
V = E+ R, where E is the expectation valuation with Ei(p) =
∑
s∈S p(s)µi(s) for i ∈ [n],
and R is the risk valuation, a continuous valuation with the Risk-Positivity property: For
each player i ∈ [n] and mixed profile p, (C.1) Ri(p) ≥ 0 and (C.2) Ri(p) = 0 if and only if
for each profile s ∈ S with p(s) > 0, µi(s) remains constant over all choices of strategies by
the other players; in such case, Vi(p) = Ei(p) = µi(s) for any profile s ∈ S with p(s) > 0.
For each integer k ≥ 0, the k-moment valuation is given by
kMi(p) =
∑
s∈S
p(s) (µi(s)− Ei(p))k ,
for each player i ∈ [n]; so, 1M = 0. Furthermore, 2M, known as variance and denoted as Var,
is concave; hence, also is the square root of variance, known as standard deviation and denoted
as SD. However, k-moments of order higher than 2 are not concave.
We shall consider ν-valuations Vν = ν−1(E(ν(.))), for an increasing and strictly convex
function ν; so, ν−1, and hence Vν , is concave. So, for a player i,
Vνi (p) = ν
−1
(∑
s∈S
p (s) · ν (µi(s))
)
;
set also Rν := Vν − E. We observe:
Lemma 2.1 For an increasing and strictly convex function ν, the risk valuation Rν has the
Risk-Positivity property.
∗∗We shall mostly treat a valuation function Vi and a valuation V interchangeably for an easier notation; we
shall use Vi only when pi has some special property.
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Proof: Fix a player i ∈ [n] and a profile p. Then, Rνi (p) ≥ 0 if and only if Vνi (p) ≥ Ei (p) if
and only if
ν−1
(∑
s∈S
p (s) · ν (µi(s))
)
≥
∑
s∈S
p (s) · µi(s)
if and only if (since ν is increasing)∑
s∈S
p (s) · ν (µi(s)) ≥ ν
(∑
s∈S
p (s) · µi(s)
)
.
Now (C.1) follows since ν is convex; (C.2) follows since ν is strictly convex.
By Lemma 2.1, for an increasing and strictly convex function ν, Vν is an (E+ R)-valuation.
We shall deal with cases where for a player i ∈ [n] and a mixed profile p, {µi(s) | p(s) >
0} = {a, b} with a < b, so that Ri(p) depends on the three parameters a, b and q, where
q :=
∑
s∈S |µi(s)=b
p(s). Then, denote
V̂i(a, b, q) := a+ q(b − a) + R̂i(a, b, q) .
2.3 E-Strict Concavity
We introduce a refinement of concavity:
Definition 2.2 (E-Strict Concavity) Fix a player i. The (E + R)-valuation Vi is E-
strictly concave if for every game G, the following conditions hold for a fixed partial mixed
profile p−i:
(1) Vi is concave in the mixed strategy pi.
(2) For a pair of mixed strategies p′i, p
′′
i ∈ ∆(Si), if Ei (p′i,p−i) 6= Ei (p′′i ,p−i), then for
any λ with 0 < λ < 1,
Vi (λp
′
i + (1− λ)p′′i ,p−i) > λVi (p′i,p−i) + (1 − λ)Vi (p′′i ,p−i) .
Note that E-strict concavity is different from the strict concavity formulated in [12, Section
2], and denoted here as FP-strict concavity, by using the payoff distribution Pi, which is the
probability distribution on the costs induced by a mixed strategy pi and a partial mixed profile
p−i.
†† A closure property of E-strict concavity follows.
††In Appendix A, we provide a counterexample to demonstrate that the valuation E + Var is not FP-strictly
concave.
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Corollary 2.2 Fix an arbitrary pair of an E-strictly concave valuation V(1) and a concave
valuation V(2). Then, for any λ, with 0 < λ ≤ 1, the valuation V = λV(1) + (1 − λ)V(2) is
E-strictly concave.
We observe:
Lemma 2.3 The valuations E+ γ · Var and E+ γ · SD, with γ > 0, are E-strictly concave.
Proof: Fix a game G and a player i ∈ [n]. Recall that Var and SD are concave in the mixed
strategy pi. Also,
Vari (pi,p−i) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)µ2i (s)−
 ∑
ℓ∈σ(pi)
pi(ℓ)Ei
(
pℓi ,p−i
)2 ;
so, the non-linear term in the mixed strategy pi is a function in the variables Ei
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
, with
ℓ ∈ σ(pi). Assume that there are strategies r, t ∈ σ(pi) such that Ei (pri ,p−i) 6= Ei
(
pti,p−i
)
.
Since the function ν̂(x) = −x2 is strictly concave, we get that
Vari (pi,p−i)
>
∑
s∈S
p(s)µ2i (s)−
∑
ℓ∈σ(pi)
pi(ℓ)E
2
i
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
=
∑
ℓ∈σ(pi)
pi(ℓ)
∑
s−i∈S−i
p (s−i) · µ2i
(
pℓi , s−i
)− ∑
ℓ∈σ(pi)
pi(ℓ)E
2
i
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
=
∑
ℓ∈σ(pi)
pi(ℓ)
 ∑
s−i∈S−i
p (s−i) · µ2i
(
pℓi , s−i
)− E2i (pℓi ,p−i)

=
∑
ℓ∈σ(pi)
pi(ℓ)Vari
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
,
as needed. Now, SD is E-strictly concave as the square root of Var.
By Corollary 2.2 and Lemma 2.3, it follows:
Corollary 2.4 The valuation V = λ(E + γ · Var) + (1 − λ)Vν, with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν is
increasing and strictly convex, and with γ > 0, is E-strictly concave.
3 Equilibria and Their Properties
3.1 V-Equilibrium
Fix a player i ∈ [n]. The pure strategy pℓi is a Vi-best pure response to a partial mixed profile
p−i if
Vi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
= min
{
Vi
(
pℓ
′
i ,p−i
)
| ℓ′ ∈ Si
}
;
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so, the pure strategy pℓi minimizes the valuation Vi (.,p−i) of player i over her pure strategies.
The mixed strategy pi is a Vi-best response to p−i if
Vi (pi,p−i) = min {Vi (p′i,p−i) | p′i ∈ ∆(Si)} ;
so, the mixed strategy pi minimizes the valuation Vi (.,p−i) of player i over her mixed strategies.
The mixed profile p is a V-equilibrium if for each player i, the mixed strategy pi is a Vi-best
response to p−i; so, no player could unilaterally deviate to another mixed strategy to reduce
her cost. Denote as ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM the algorithmic problem of deciding, given a game G,
the existence of a V-equilibrium for GV.
3.2 The Optimal-Value Property
We show:
Proposition 3.1 (The Optimal-Value Property) Fix a game G, a player i ∈ [n] and a
partial mixed profile p−i. Assume that (A.1) the valuation Vi (pi,p−i) is concave in pi, and
(A.2) p̂i is a Vi-best response to p−i. Then, for any mixed strategy qi with σ (qi) ⊆ σ (p̂i),
Vi (qi,p−i) = Vi (p̂i,p−i).
Proof: Set A := Vi (p̂i,p−i). Since p̂i is a Vi-best response to pi, it follows that Vi (qi,p−i) ≥
A for each mixed strategy qi ∈ ∆(Si) with σ (qi) ⊆ σ (p̂i). Assume, by way of contradiction,
that there is a mixed strategy qi ∈ ∆(Si) with σ (qi) ⊆ σ (pi) such that Vi (qi,p−i) > A.
Denote as ∆ (σ (p̂i)) the set of mixed strategies for player i with supports contained in σ (p̂i);
so, ∆ (σ (p̂i)) is a subspace in [0, 1]
|σ(p̂i)|.
For each λ ∈ [0, 1], the strategies λp̂i + (1 − λ)qi form a line segment in ∆(σ (p̂i)). Extend
this line segment to some strategy q̂i ∈ ∆ (σ (p̂i)) with q̂i 6= p̂i so that p̂i is an interior point
on the line segment connecting qi and q̂i. The extension is possible since p̂i(j) > 0 for each
strategy j ∈ σ (p̂i), so that p̂i is an interior point in ∆ (σ (p̂i)). Since p̂i is a Vi-best response to
p−i, it follows that Vi (q̂i,p−i) ≥ A. So, there are points p̂i, qi, q̂i so that:
• p̂i is an interior point on the line segment connecting qi and q̂i.
• Vi (p̂i,p−i) = A, Vi (qi,p−i) > A and Vi (q̂i,p−i) ≥ A.
A contradiction to the concavity of Vi (.,p−i).
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3.3 The Strong Equilibrium and Weak Equilibrium Properties
The mixed profile p has the Strong Equilibrium property [22, Section 2.6] for player i in the
game GV if for each strategy ℓ ∈ σ(pi),
Vi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
= min
{
Vi
(
pℓ
′
i ,p−i
)
| ℓ′ ∈ Si
}
;
so, each strategy in the support of player i is a Vi-best pure response to the partial mixed profile
p−i. Clearly, the Optimal-Value property for player i implies the Strong Equilibrium property
for player i; Proposition 3.1 extends [22, Proposition 2.1], establishing the Strong Equilibrium
property with the same assumptions.
The mixed profile p has theWeak Equilibrium property [22, Section 2.6] for player i ∈ [n] in the
game GV if for each pair of strategies ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ σ(pi), Vi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
= Vi
(
pℓ
′
i ,p−i
)
. The mixed profile
p has the Weak Equilibrium property [22, Section 2.6] in GV if it has the Weak Equilibrium
property for each player i ∈ [n] in GV. (So, Strong Equilibrium implies Weak Equilibrium.)
3.4 The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation Property
We introduce:
Definition 3.1 (The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation Property) The valua-
tion V has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property if the following condition holds
for every game G: For each player i ∈ [n], if pi is a Vi-best-response to p−i, then p has
the Weak Equilibrium property for player i in the game GE: for each pair of strategies
ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ σ(pi), Ei
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
= Ei
(
pℓ
′
i ,p−i
)
.
We now prove that E-strict concavity implies the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property:
Proposition 3.2 Take a player i ∈ [n] where Vi is E-strictly concave. Then, V has the Weak-
Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for player i.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that V does not have the Weak-Equilibrium-for-
Expectation property for player i. Then, there is a game G, a partial mixed profile p−i and a
mixed strategy pi which is a Vi-best-response to p−i such that for some strategies r, t ∈ σ(pi),
Ei (p
r
i ,p−i) 6= Ei
(
pti,p−i
)
. Since Vi is E-strictly concave, this implies that
Vi
(
1
2
pri +
1
2
pti,p−i
)
>
1
2
Vi (p
r
i ,p−i) +
1
2
Vi
(
pti,p−i
)
.
Since Vi is concave, the Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) implies that
Vi
(
1
2
pri +
1
2
pti,p−i
)
= Vi (p
r
i ,p−i) = Vi
(
pti,p−i
)
.
A contradiction.
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By Lemma 2.3 and Corollary 2.4, Proposition 3.2 immediately implies:
Corollary 3.3 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where (1) R = γ · Var, or (2) R = γ · SD, or (3)
V = λ(E+ γ · Var) + (1− λ)Vν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν is increasing and strictly convex, and
with γ > 0. Then, V has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
We now turn to a particular concave valuation and exploit the Optimal-Value property (Propo-
sition 3.1) to prove:
Proposition 3.4 Fix a player i ∈ [n], and consider the concave valuation
Vi = α0 · Ei +
∑
2≤k≤ℓ|k is even
αk · kMi ,
for some constants αk ≥ 0, 0 ≤ k ≤ ℓ. Then, Vi has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation
property for player i.
Proof: Fix a game G. Clearly, for a mixed profile p,
2kMi(p)
=
∑
s∈S
(µi(s)− Ei(p))2k p(s)
=
∑
s∈S
(
2k∑
t=0
(−1)t
(
2k
t
)
(µi(s))
t
(Ei(p))
2k−t
)
p(s)
=
2k∑
t=0
(−1)t
(
2k
t
) (∑
s∈S
(µi(s))
t
p(s)
)
(Ei(p))
2k−t
=
2k∑
t=2
(−1)t
(
2k
t
) (∑
s∈S
(µi(s))
t
p(s)
)
(Ei(p))
2k−t
︸ ︷︷ ︸
polynomial of degree bounded by 2k − 1 in p
− (2k − 1) (Ei(p))2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
polynomial of degree 2k
.
Since
Vi(p) = α0 · Ei(p) +
∑
2≤k≤ℓ
α2l · 2lM ,
so that Vi(p) is the sum of (i) the highest-degree term −(2ℓ−1) (Ei(p))2ℓ, which is a polynomial
of degree 2ℓ in p, and (ii) a polynomial of degree bounded by 2ℓ − 1 in p. Since Vi(p) is a
concave polynomial in p, the Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) implies that Vi(p) is a
constant polynomial in p. Hence, it follows that −(2 ℓ− 1) · (Ei(p))2 ℓ is a constant polynomial
in p; thus, so is Ei(p). The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for player i follows.
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Brautbar et al. [5, Section 3.1] study a class of valuations, coming from the Mean-Variance
paradigm of Markowitz [21] and termed as Mean-Variance Preference Functions; we rephrase
their definition [5, Definition 1] to fit into the adopted setting of minimization games:
Definition 3.2 ([5]) Fix a player i ∈ [n]. A Mean-Variance Preference Function is a valuation
Vi (pi,p−i) := Gi (Ei (pi,p−i) ,Vari (pi,p−i)) which satisfies:
(1) Vi (pi,p−i) is concave in pi.
(2) Gi is non-decreasing in its first argument (Ei (pi,p−i)).
(3) Fix a partial mixed profile p−i and a nonempty convex subset ∆ ⊆ ∆i = ∆(Si) such that
Vi (pi,p−i) is constant on ∆. Then, both Ei (pi,p−i) and Vari (pi,p−i) are constant on ∆.
So, a Mean-Variance Preference Function simultaneously generalizes and restricts the (E +
R)-valuations; it generalizes sum to G but restricts R to Var. Note that Condition (3) in
Definition 3.2 may be seen as a generalization of theWeak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property
conditioned on the assumption that Vi (pi,p−i) is constant on a nonempty convex set ∆ ⊆ ∆i.
It is proved in [5, Claim 1] that E+Var is a Mean-Variance Preference Function. Since E+Var
is E-strictly concave (Lemma 2.3) and has the Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1), their
established Condition (3) is a special case of our general result that every E-strictly concave
valuation has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property (Proposition 3.2).
4 Two Strategies
4.1 Player-Specific Scheduling Games
A player-specific scheduling game [22, Section 3] is equipped with an integer weight ω(i, i′, ℓ)
for each triple of a player i ∈ [n], a player i′ ∈ [n] and a strategy ℓ ∈ Si, also called link, with
S1 = . . . = Sn = [m]; ω(i, i
′, ℓ) represents the load due to player i′ incurred to player i on
link ℓ. Given the collection of weights {ω(i, i′, ℓ)}i,i′∈[n],ℓ∈[m], the cost function µi is defined by
µi (s) =
∑
i′∈[n] | si′=si
ω (i, i′, si). In a player-specific scheduling game on two ordered links 1
and 2 [22, Section 5.2.2], for each pair of players i, i′ ∈ [n], either ω(i, i′, 1) = ω(i, i′, 2) = 0 or
ω(i, i′, 1) < ω(i, i′, 2).
We derive a combinatorial formula for the k-moment valuation of the cost of a player
choosing a link ℓ in a player-specific scheduling game. The formula takes the form of a partition
polynomial [3]: a multivariable polynomial defined by a sum over partitions of the integer k.
The formula uses the function f : [0, 1] × N0 → R with
f(x, j) := (−x)j(1− x) + (1− x)jx .
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Note that
f(x, j) =
{
x(1 − x) (xj−1 + (1− x)j−1) , for an even integer j ≥ 2
x(1 − x) (−xj−1 + (1− x)j−1) , for an odd integer j ≥ 3 .
The following simple claim follows by inspection.
Lemma 4.1 The function f has the following properties:
1. f(x, 0) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1].
f(x, 1) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1].
f(0, j) = f(1, j) = 0 for all integers j ≥ 0.
2. For an even integer j ≥ 2:
f(x, j) > 0 for all 0 < x < 1.
f(x, j) = f(1− x, j) for all x ∈ [0, 1].
3. For an odd integer j ≥ 3:
f
(
1
2 , j
)
= 0.
f(x, j) > 0 for all 0 < x < 12 .
f(x, j) < 0 for all 12 < x < 1.
f(x, j) = −f(1− x, j) for all x ∈ [0, 1].
We show:
Proposition 4.2 Consider a player-specific scheduling game with n players. Then, for each
player i ∈ [n], for a link ℓ ∈ [m] and a mixed profile p,
kMi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
=
∑
〈r1, . . . , rn〉 ∈ Nn0 |∑
j∈[n] rj = k, ri = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n] : rj 6= 1
k!
r1! . . . rn!
∏
j∈[n]\{i}
f (pj(ℓ), rj) (ω(i, j, ℓ))
rj .
Proof: We shall first consider the special cases k = 0 and k = 1.
The case k = 0:
Clearly, 0Mi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
=
∑
s∈S (µi(s)− Ei(p))0 p(s) =
∑
s∈S p(s) = 1. The formula has value∑
r1, . . . , rn |∑
j∈[n] rj = 0, ri = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n] : rj 6= 1
0!
r1! . . . rn!
∏
j∈[n]\{i}
f (pj(ℓ), rj) (ω(i, j, ℓ))
rj = 1 .
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The case k = 1: Clearly,
1Mi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
=
∑
s∈S
(µi(s)− Ei(p))1 p(s) = 0 .
The value of the formula is∑
r1, . . . , rn |∑
j∈[n] rj = 1, ri = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n] : rj 6= 1
1!
r1! . . . rn!
∏
j∈[n]\{i}
f (pj(ℓ), rj) (ω(i, j, ℓ))
rj = 0 ,
since there is no term to add.
Assume now that k ≥ 2. The proof is by induction on the number of players n. For the
basis case where n = 1, kM1(p
ℓ
1, .) = 0, and 0 is also the value given by the formula (since
r1 = 0 implies
∑
j rj 6= k, and there is no term to add).
Assume inductively that the formula holds for n − 1 players. For the induction step, we
shall establish the formula for n players. Without loss of generality, fix i := 1. For simplicity,
write pj and ωj for pj(ℓ) and ω(i, j, ℓ), respectively. For any integer t ≤ k, denote as p | t the
restriction of p to the players 1, . . . , t; so, p | n = p. Set kM1(t) := kM1
(
pℓ1, (p | t)−1
)
; so,
kM1(n) = kM1
(
pℓ1,p−1
)
. Clearly,
kM1(n)
=
∑
s∈S
p(s) (µ1(s)− E1(p))k
=
∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n) ·
(
(µ1(s−n) + wn − E1(p))k pn + (µ1(s−n)− E1(p))k (1− pn)
)
=
∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n) ·(
(µ1(s−n) + wn − E1(p | (n− 1))− pnwn)k pn + (µ1(s−n)− E1(p | (n− 1))− pnwn)k (1− pn)
)
=
∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n) ·(
(µ1(s−n)− E1(p | (n− 1)) + wn(1 − pn))k pn + (µ1(s−n)− E1(p | (n− 1))− pnwn)k (1− pn)
)
.
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Set B = B(s−n) := µ1(s−n)− E1(p | (n− 1)). Then,
kM1(n)
=
∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n)
(
(B+ (1− pn)wn)k pn + (B− pnwn)k (1 − pn)
)
=
∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n)
((
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Bt(1− pn)k−t (wn)k−t
)
pn +
(
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Bt(−pn)k−t (wn)k−t
)
(1− pn)
)
=
∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n)
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Bt
(
pn(1 − pn)k−t + (1− pn)(−pn)k−t
)
(wn)
k−t
=
∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n)
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
Btf (pn, k − t) (wn)k−t
=
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)  ∑
s−n∈S−n
p(s−n) · (B(s−n))t
 f (pn, k − t) (wn)k−t
=
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
tM1(n− 1) f (pn, k − t) (wn)k−t .
By induction hypothesis, it follows that
kM1(n)
=
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)

∑
r1, . . . , rn−1 |∑
j∈[n−1] rj = t, r1 = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n− 1] : rj 6= 1
t!
r1! . . . rn−1!
∏
j∈[n−1]\{1}
f (pj , rj) (ωj)
rj

f (pn, k − t) (wn)k−t
=
∑
r1, . . . , rn−1 |∑
j∈[n−1] rj = t, r1 = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n− 1] : rj 6= 1
k∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
t!
r1! . . . rn−1!
·
∏
j∈[n−1]\1
f (pj , rj) f (pn, k − t) · (ωj)rj (wn)k−t
=
∑
r1, . . . , rn−1 |∑
j∈[n−1] rj = t, r1 = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n− 1] : rj 6= 1
k∑
t=0
k!
r1! . . . rn−1!(k − t)! ·
∏
j∈[n−1]\{1}
f (pj , rj) f (pn, k − t) · (ωj)rj (wn)k−t
=
∑
r1, . . . , rn−1, rn |∑
j∈[n] rj = k, r1 = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n− 1] : rj 6= 1
k!
r1! . . . rn−1!rn!
·
∏
j∈[n]\{1}
f (pj , rj) · (ωj)rj .
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Since f(pn, rn) = 0 when rn = 1, it follows that
kM1(n) =
∑
r1, . . . , rn−1, rn |∑
j∈[n] rj = k, r1 = 0
& ∀j ∈ [n] : rj 6= 1
k!
r1! . . . rn!
·
∏
j∈[n]\{1}
f (pj , rj) · (ωj)rj ,
as needed. By Lemma 4.1,
f (pj(1), rj) =
{
f (1− pj(1), rj) , for even rj
−f (1− pj(1), rj) if rj is odd
Since
∑
j∈[n]\{i} rj = k and k is even, the number of odd rj ’s is even, and this implies that
α1i = α
2
i .
4.2 The Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors Property
We show:
Proposition 4.3 (The Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors Property) Fix a player-specific
scheduling game on two ordered links 1 and 2. Fix an (E+R)-valuation V, where R is either (1)
Var, or (2) SD, or (3) a concave linear sum
∑
k∈{2,4,6,8} αk ·kM, with αk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}.
Fix a V-equilibrium p and a player i ∈ [n]. Then, either (C.1) player i is pure, or (C.2) all
players i′ ∈ [n] \ {i} with ω(i, i′, 1) 6= 0 are pure.
Proof: We first prove a key property of moment valuations kM, where k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}.
Lemma 4.4 Fix a player-specific scheduling game on two ordered links 1 and 2. Fix the valu-
ation kM, for an even integer k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}. Fix a mixed profile p and a player i ∈ [n]. Then,
one of the conditions (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) holds: (C.1) Player i is pure. (C.2) All players i′ ∈
[n]\{i} with ω (i, i′, 1) 6= 0 are pure. (C.3) Player i is mixed with kMi
(
p1i ,p−i
)
< kMi
(
p2i ,p−i
)
.
For the proof of Lemma 4.4, we shall employ a combinatorial Embracing Lemma (Lemma 4.5)
to establish that the k-moment valuation increases strictly monotone for k ∈ {6, 8}; it seems
that a different technique is needed to extend Lemma 4.4 beyond k = 8.
Lemma 4.5 (Embracing Lemma) Fix a pair of odd integers r ≥ 3 and s ≥ 3. Fix probabil-
ities p and q with 0 < p < 12 and
1
2 < q < 1. Fix a weight w and a pair of numbers α, β ∈ R+
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with α · β ≥ 12 . Then, the function
F(y) := α · 1
(r − 1)! ·
1
(s+ 1)!
f(p, r − 1) · f(q, s+ 1)ws+1yr−1
+
1
r!
· 1
s!
f(p, r) · f(q, s)wsyr
+β · 1
(r + 1)!
· 1
(s− 1)! f(p, r + 1) · f(q, s− 1)w
s−1yr+1
increases strictly monotone in y.
The Embracing Lemma establishes that a triple of “adjacent” partitions in the formula from
Proposition 4.2 increases strictly monotone; intuitively, the terms corresponding to two of the
partitions in the triple are positive and “help out” by embracing the third negative term to
counterbalance its negative effect to increasing monotonicity.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4.5 uses an elementary observation:
Observation 4.1 Consider an odd integer r ≥ 3. Then, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
f(x, r − 1) · f(x, r + 1) > (f(x, r))2 .
Proof: The claim amounts to
x2 (1− x)2 (xr−2 + (1− x)r−2) · (xr + (1− x)r) > x2(1− x)2 ((1− x)r − xr) ,
which holds trivially.
We continue with the proof of the Embracing Lemma. Write
F(y) := a · yr−1 − b · yr + c · yr+1 ,
with
a := α · 1
(r − 1)! ·
1
(s+ 1)!
f(p, r − 1) · f(q, s+ 1)ws+1 ,
b := − 1
r!
· 1
s!
f(p, r) · f(q, s)ws ,
c := β · 1
(r + 1)!
· 1
(s − 1)! f(p, r + 1) · f(q, s − 1)w
s−1 .
Note that a, b, c > 0. Clearly,
F′(y) = (r − 1) a yr−2 − r b yr−1 + (r + 1) c yr
= yr−2 · ((r − 1) a− r b y + (r + 1) c y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=h(y)
.
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We shall prove that h′(y) > 0 for all y ≥ 0. Clearly,
h′(y) = −r b+ 2 (r + 1) c y ,
and
h′′(y) = 2 (r + 1)y > 0 .
Thus, h(y) takes its minimum value for y0 =
rb
2(r + 1)c
. Hence, it suffices to prove that h(y0) > 0.
Clearly,
h(y0) = (r − 1) a− r b rb
2(r + 1)c
+ (r + 1) c
(
rb
2(r + 1)c
)2
= (r − 1) a− r
2
4(r + 1)
· b
2
c
;
thus, h(y0) > 0 if and only if
4 ac
b2
>
r2
r2 − 1 .
We now verify the latter condition. Note that
4 ac
b2
= 4αβ
(r!)2
(r − 1)!(r + 1)!
(s!)2
(s− 1)!(s+ 1)!
f(p, r − 1)f(p, r + 1)
(f(p, r))2
f(q, s− 1)f(q, s+ 1)
(f(q, s))2
.
By Observation 4.1, it follows that
4 ac
b2
> 2 · r
r + 1
· s
s+ 1
≥ r
r + 1
· 3
2
≥ r
2
r2 − 1 ,
since s ≥ 3 and r ≥ 3.
We now continue with the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Proof: If Condition (C.1) holds, then we are done. So, assume that Condition (C.1) does
not hold, so that player i is mixed. If Condition (C.3) holds, then we are done. So, assume
that Condition (C.3) does not hold. Since player i is mixed, this implies that kMi
(
p1i ,p−i
) ≥
kMi
(
p2i ,p−i
)
. We shall establish Condition (C.2). We proceed by case analysis.
The cases k = 2 and k = 4: By Proposition 4.2, for each link ℓ ∈ [2],
2Mi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
=
∑
j∈[n]\{i}|ω(i,j,ℓ)6=0
f (pj(ℓ), 2) (ω(i, j, ℓ))
2
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and
4Mi
(
pℓi ,p−i
)
=
∑
j∈[n]\{i}|ω(i,j,ℓ)6=0
f (pj(ℓ), 4) (ω(i, j, ℓ))
4
+ ∑
j,k∈[n]\{i},j 6=k|ω(i,j,ℓ)6=0,ω(i,k,ℓ)6=0
f (pj(ℓ), 2) · f (pk(ℓ), 2) (ω(i, j, ℓ)ω(i, k, ℓ))2 .
Since (i) pj(ℓ) = 1 − pj(ℓ), (ii) f(x, 2) = f(1 − x, 2) for x ∈ [0, 1], & (iii) for each player
j ∈ [n] \ {i}, ω(i, j, 1) 6= 0 if and only if ω(i, j, 2) 6= 0, it follows that
2Mi
(
p1i ,p−i
)− 2Mi (p2i ,p−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
=
∑
j∈[n]\{i}|ω(i,j,1) 6=0,ω(i,j,2) 6=0
f (pj(ℓ), 2) ·
(
(ω(i, j, 1))2 − (ω(i, j, 2))2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
,
and
4Mi
(
p1i ,p−i
)− 4Mi (p2i ,p−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
=
∑
j∈[n]\{i}|ω(i,j,1) 6=0,ω(i,j,2) 6=0
f (pj(1), 4) ·
(
(ω(i, j, 1))4 − (ω(i, j, 2))4
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∑
j,k∈[n]\{i},j 6=k|ω(i,j,1)·ω(i,j,2)·ω(i,k,1)·ω(i,k,2) 6=0
f (pj(1), 2) · f (pk(1), 2)
·
(
(ω(i, j, 1))
2
(ω(i, k, 1))
2 − (ω(i, j, 2))2 (ω(i, k, 2))2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
Since the two links are ordered, it follows that for each player j ∈ [n] \ {i}, f (pj(1), 2) =
f (pj(1), 4) = 0, which implies that pj(1) = 1 and player j is pure, as needed for Condition
(C.2).
For the remaining cases k ∈ {6, 8}, we shall be establishing that kMi increases strictly
monotone in the weights. Since the two links are ordered, the inequality kMi
(
p1i ,p−i
) ≥
kMi
(
p2i ,p−i
)
implies that for each player j ∈ [n] \ {i} with ω(i, j, 1) 6= 0 and ω(i, j, 2) 6= 0,
f (pj(1), rj) = f (pj(1), rj) = 0, which implies that pj(1) = 1 and player j is pure, as needed for
Condition (C.2). We shall be referring again to the formula from Proposition 4.2.
The case k = 6: Note that 6 can be partitioned as 6, (4, 2), (3, 3), (2, 4) and (2, 2, 2). The terms
of the formula corresponding to the partitions 6 and (2, 2, 2) have strictly positive coefficients;
so, they are increasing strictly monotone in the weights. Now group together the terms of the
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formula corresponding to the partitions with (rj , rk) ∈ {(4, 2), (3, 3), (2, 4)} in a single sum.
Lemma 4.5 (with α = β = 1) implies that the sum increases strictly monotone in the weights.
The case k = 8: The only partitions of 8 that use odd numbers are (i) (5, 3) and (3, 5), and (ii)
(3, 3, 2), (3, 2, 3) and (2, 3, 3). Partitions in (i) involve two strategies, while partitions in (ii)
involve three strategies.
Case (i): Let j and k be the two strategies with 0 < pj(ℓ) <
1
2 and
1
2 < pk(ℓ) < 1 for a link
ℓ ∈ [2]; so, f (pj(ℓ), 3) · f (pk(ℓ), 5) < 0 and f (pj(ℓ), 5) · f (pk(ℓ), 3) < 0.
Consider now the terms of the formula corresponding to the partitions with
(rj , rk) ∈ {(6, 2), (5, 3), (4, 4), (3, 5), (2, 6)} .
First group together the terms corresponding to the partitions with
(rj , rk) ∈ {(6, 2), (5, 3), (4, 4)}
in a single sum, and invoke Lemma 4.5 with α = 1 and β = 12; it follows that the sum
increases strictly monotone in the weights. Then, group together the terms corresponding to
the partitions with
(rj , rk) ∈ {(2, 6), (3, 5), (4, 4)}
in a single sum, and invoke Lemma 4.5 with α = 1 and β = 12; it follows that the sum increases
strictly monotone in the weights.
Case (ii): Let j, k and t be the three strategies with 0 < pj(1) <
1
2 and
1
2 < pk(1) < 1 for a link
ℓ ∈ [2]; assume, without loss of generality, that 12 < pk(ℓ) < 1; so, f (pj(ℓ), 3) · f (pk(ℓ), 3) < 0
and f (pj(ℓ), 3) · f (pt(ℓ), 3) < 0, while f (pj(ℓ), 3) · f (pt(ℓ), 3) > 0. Consider now the terms of the
formula corresponding to the partitions with
(rj , rk, rt) ∈ {(4, 2, 2), (3, 3, 2), (2, 4, 2), (3, 2, 3), (2, 2, 4)} .
In the same way as for Case (i), Lemma 4.5 implies that the sum of the terms corresponding
to these partitions increases strictly monotone in the weights.
We continue with the proof of Proposition 4.3. Consider the k-moment valuation kM with
k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}. So, Lemma 4.4 applies. Assume, by way of contradiction, that Condition (C.3)
holds; then, kMi
(
p1i ,p−i
)
< kMi
(
p2i ,p−i
)
, which implies, by definition of R, that Ri
(
p1i ,p−i
)
<
Ri
(
p2i ,p−i
)
. By the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property, Ei
(
p1i ,p−i
)
= Ei
(
p2i ,p−i
)
.
Hence, Vi
(
p1i ,p−i
)
< Vi
(
p2i ,p−i
)
. Since V is concave, the Optimal-Value property (Proposi-
tion 3.1) implies that Vi
(
p1i ,p−i
)
= Vi
(
p2i ,p−i
)
. A contradiction. Hence, by Lemma 4.4, either
(C.1) player i is pure, or (C.2) all players i′ ∈ [n] \ {i} with ω(i, i′, 1) 6= 0 are pure.
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4.3 NP-Hardness Result
We give an example of a player-specific scheduling game G with n = 3 players 0, 1 and 2 on
two ordered links 1 and 2, with no V-equilibrium for an (E+R)-valuation V, where R is (1) Var,
or (2) SD, or (3) a concave linear sum
∑
k∈{2,4,6,8} αk · kM, with αk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}. For
i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and ℓ ∈ [2], set
ω(i, i, ℓ) := 0 ;
ω(i, (i+ 1) mod 3, ℓ) := δℓ 2 ;
ω(i, (i+ 2) mod 3, ℓ) := 2 + δℓ 2 .
(δ is the Kronecker delta: δℓ2 = 1 if ℓ = 2 and 0 otherwise.) Assume, by way of contradiction,
that G has a pure equilibrium. If the three players are on the same link, then each player
has cost greater than 0 and can reduce her cost by switching to the other link. If two of the
players are on the same link ℓ ∈ [2] while the third player is on link ℓ. (ℓ denotes the link
other than ℓ.) Then, there is a player i ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that player i is on link ℓ while player
(i + 1) mod 3 is on link ℓ; her cost on link ℓ is 2 + δℓ 2, and she can reduce her cost to δℓ 2 by
switching to link ℓ. A contradiction in both cases. Finally, assume that there is a V-equilibium
p where some player i ∈ {0, 1, 2} is mixed. By the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property
(Proposition 4.3), players (i+1) mod 3 and (i+2) mod 3 are pure. By the Weak-Equilibrium-
for-Expectation property (Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4), Ei
(
p1i ,p−i
)
= Ei
(
p2i ,p−i
)
or∑
i′ 6=i|pi′=p
1
i′
ω(i, i′, 1) =
∑
i′ 6=i|pi′=p
2
i′
ω(i, i′, 2). By the definition of weights, a contradiction
follows. Thus, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is non-trivial in the considered setting. We show:
Theorem 4.6 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where R is (1) Var, or (2) SD, or (3) a concave
linear sum
∑
k∈{2,4,6,8} αk · kM, with αk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8}. Then, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is
strongly NP-hard for player-specific scheduling games on two ordered links.
The proof will use a reduction from MULTIBALANCED PARTITION, a problem we introduce
and show strongly NP-complete:
I.: 〈n,m,A〉, with integers n, m and a set A = {aij | i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}.
Q.: Is there a subset I ⊂ [n] such that for each j ∈ [m], ∑i∈I aij = 3 + 2 ∑i 6∈I aij?
We show:
Proposition 4.7 MULTIBALANCED PARTITION is strongly NP-complete.
The proof of Proposition 4.7 employs a reduction from 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING [16, SP1]:
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I.: 〈W,X,Y,M〉, where M is a set with M ⊆W× X× Y and W, X and Y are disjoint
sets with |W| = |X| = |Y| = q.
Q.: Does M contain a matching, i.e., a subset M′ ⊂ M with |M′| = q such that no two
elements of M′ agree in any coordinate?
Proof: Clearly, MULTIBALANCED PARTITION belongs to NP. For the NP-hardness we
shall employ a reduction from 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING.‡‡ Given an instance 〈W,X,Y,M〉
of 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING, with W = {w1, . . . , wq}, X = {x1, . . . , xq}, Y = {y1, . . . , yq}
and M = {m1, . . . ,mk}, where for each i ∈ [k], mi = (wf(i), xg(i), yh(i)) with functions f, g, h :
[k] → [q] giving the first, second and third coordinate, respectively, of each element mi ∈ M,
we construct an instance 〈n,m,A〉 of MULTIBALANCED PARTITION as follows:
• n := k + 1 and m := 3q.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
aij :=

1 , if (1 ≤ j ≤ q and j = f(i))
or (q + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2q and j − q = g(i))
or (2q + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3q and j − 2q = h(i))
0 , otherwise
,
and for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
ak+1,j := 2 bj ,
where
bj :=
∑
i∈[k]
aij .
We prove:
Lemma 4.8 〈W,X,Y,M〉 has a solution if and only if 〈n,m,A〉 has a solution.
Proof: “⇒”: Assume first that 〈W,X,Y,M〉 has a solution M′. Set
I′ :=
{
i ∈ [k] | mi ∈ M′
}
.
Then, clearly, for each j ∈ [m], ∑i∈I′ aij = 1. Hence, for each j ∈ [m],∑
i∈[k]\I′
aij =
∑
i∈[k]
aij −
∑
i∈I′
aij = bj − 1 .
‡‡The reduction is very similar to the one used in the proof of [16, Theorem 3.5].
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Set now I := I′ ∪ {k + 1}. Then, for each j ∈ [m],∑
i∈I
aij =
∑
i∈I′
aij + ak+1,j
= 1 + 2 bj
= 3 + 2 (bj − 1)
= 3 + 2
∑
i∈[k]\I′
aij
= 3 + 2
∑
i 6∈I
aij ,
so that I is a solution of 〈n,m,A〉.
“⇐”: Assume now that 〈n,m,A〉 has a solution I. We claim that k+1 ∈ I: Assume, by way
of contradiction, that k + 1 6∈ I. Then, for each j ∈ [m],
3 + 2
∑
i 6∈I
aij
≥ 3 + 2 ak+1,j (since k + 1 6∈ I)
= 3 + 4bj (by definition of ak+1,j)
> bj
=
∑
i∈[k] aij (by definition of bj)
≥ ∑i∈I aij ,
a contradiction to the assumption that I is a solution of 〈n,m,A〉. So, k + 1 ∈ I.
Fix now an arbitrary j ∈ [m]. Set ∆j :=
∑
i∈I\{k+1} aij . Since I is a solution of 〈n,m,A〉,∑
i∈I
aij = 3 + 2
∑
i6∈I
aij .
Since k + 1 ∈ I, this implies that
ak+1,j +
∑
i∈I\{k+1}
aij = 3+ 2
∑
i∈[k]
aij −
∑
i∈I\{k+1}
aij
 .
Hence,
2 bj +∆j = 3 + 2 (bj −∆j) .
It follows that ∆j = 1, so that I \ {k + 1} is a solution of 〈W,X,Y,M〉.
Lemma 4.8 establishes the reduction for the NP-hardness; since the number involved in the
reduction are polynomially bounded, strong NP-hardness follows.
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For the proof of the reduction for Theorem 4.6, we shall use the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-
Neighbors property (Proposition 4.3) to identify the mixed players; in turn, we shall apply
the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property to the mixed players to obtain a solution to
MULTIBALANCED PARTITION or a V-equilibrium. We continue with the proof of Theorem 4.6.
Proof: We shall employ a reduction from MULTIBALANCED PARTITION. Given an instance
〈n,m,A〉 of MULTIBALANCED PARTITION, we construct an instance 〈G〉 of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM
as follows. G is a player-specific scheduling game on two ordered links with n + 5m players
in the player set Π := [n] ∪ {[k, j] | k ∈ [m], j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}}. Set M := maxk
∑
j∈[n] akj. We
assume that M ≥ 4. We now define the weights ω(π1, π2, ℓ) where π1, π2 ∈ Π and ℓ ∈ [2], where
δ is the Kronecker delta: δℓℓ′ = 1 if ℓ = ℓ
′ and 0 otherwise.
1. π1 = [k, j] with k ∈ [m] and j ∈ {0, . . . , 3}: Then,
ω([k, j], π2, ℓ) :=

M + δℓ2 , if π2 = [k, i] with i = 4 or i 6= (j + 1) mod 4
M − 4 + δℓ2 , if π2 = [k, (j + 1) mod 4]
0 , otherwise
.
2. π1 = [k, 4] with k ∈ [m]: Then,
ω([k, 4], π2, ℓ) :=

M + δℓ2 , if π2 = [k, i] with i ∈ [4]
akj , if π2 = j ∈ [n] and ℓ = 1
2 akj , if π2 = j ∈ [n] and ℓ = 2
0 , otherwise
.
3. π1 = i ∈ [n]: Then, ω(i, π2, ℓ) = 0 for all π2 ∈ Π and ℓ ∈ [2].
Note that G is a player-specific scheduling game on two ordered links. We now prove:
Lemma 4.9 In a V-equilibrium p, for each k ∈ [m], there is an index j ∈ {0, . . . , 4} such that
player [k, j] is non-pure.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is an index k̂ ∈ [m] such that all players
[k̂, j] with j ∈ {0, . . . , 4} are pure; so, p
[k̂,j]
[1] ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}. If there are at
least four players [k̂, j] with j ∈ {0, . . . , 4} choosing the same link, then at least one player [k̂, j]
with j ∈ {0, . . . , 3} can improve her cost by switching to the other link. So, assume that there
are three players [k̂, j] with j ∈ {0, . . . , 4} choosing some link ℓ ∈ [2], while the remaining two
players choose the other link. Then, there is an index j0 ∈ {0, . . . , 3} such that player [k̂, j0]
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chooses link ℓ while player [k̂, (j0+1) mod 4] chooses link ℓ. So, µ[k̂,j0](p) = 3M+3δℓ2, and player
[k̂, j0] can improve by switching to link ℓ where her cost becomes 3M − 4 + 3δℓ2 < 3M + 3δℓ2.
A contradiction to the assumption that p is a V-equilibrium.
We next prove:
Lemma 4.10 In a V-equilibrium, each player [k, j], with k ∈ [m] and j ∈ {0, . . . , 3}, is pure.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a non-pure player π = [k̂, ĵ] with k̂ ∈ [m]
and ĵ ∈ {0, . . . , 3}. Then, by the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property (Proposition 4.3),
all players [k̂, j] with j ∈ {0, . . . , 4} \ {ĵ} are pure. By the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation
property for player π, Eπ
(
p1π,p−π
)
= Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
)
. For each link ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, denote as Φℓ the
set of players [k̂, j] with j ∈ {0, . . . , 4}\{ĵ} choosing link ℓ; set yℓ := 1 if [k̂, (ĵ+1) mod 4] ∈ Φℓ
and 0 otherwise. Clearly, |y1 − y2| = 1. Then,
Eπ
(
p1π,p−π
)
= |Φ1| ·M − 4 y1 ,
and
Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
)
= |Φ2| · (M + 1)− 4 y2 .
We proceed by case analysis.
1. Assume first that |Φ1| > |Φ2|. So, |Φ1| ≥ 3 and |Φ2| ≤ 1. Then,
Eπ
(
p1π,p−π
) ≥ 3M − 4 y1 > M + 1− 4 y2 ≥ Eπ (p2π,p−π) ,
since 3M > M + 5 ≥M + 1 + 4 (y1 − y2). A contradiction.
2. Assume now that |Φ1| < |Φ2|. So, |Φ2| ≥ 3 and |Φ1| ≤ 1. Then,
Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
) ≥ 3M + 3− 4 y2 > M − 4 y1 ≥ Eπ (p1π,p−π) ,
since 3M + 3 > M + 4 ≥M + 4 (y2 − y1). A contradiction.
3. Assume finally that |Φ1| = |Φ2|. Then,
Eπ
(
p1π,p−π
)
= 2M − 4 y1 ,
and
Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
)
= 2M + 2− 4 y2 .
Since Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
)
= Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
)
, it follows that 4(y2 − y1) = 2. A contradiction.
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The claim follows.
We are now ready to prove:
Lemma 4.11 If G has a V-equilibrium, then 〈n,m,A〉 has a solution.
Proof: Consider a V-equilibrium p. By Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10, all players [k, 4] with k ∈ [m]
are non-pure. Hence, the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property (Proposition 4.3) and the
definition of the weights imply together that all players i ∈ [n] and [k, j] with k ∈ [m] and
j ∈ {0, . . . , 3} are pure. Fix now an arbitrarily chosen player π = [k̂, 4]. For each link ℓ ∈ [2],
denote Iℓ := {i ∈ [n] | pi(ℓ) = 1} and Φℓ := {[k̂, j] | j ∈ {0, . . . , 3} and p[k̂,j](ℓ) = 1}. Clearly,
Eπ
(
p1π,p−π
)
= (1 + |Φ1|) ·M +
∑
i∈I1
ai ,
and
Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
)
= (1 + |Φ2|) · (M + 1) + 2
∑
i∈I2
ai .
The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property (Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4) implies
that Eπ
(
p1π,p−π
)
= Eπ
(
p2π,p−π
)
. By the choice of M , this implies that |Φ1| = |Φ2| = 2, so
that ∑
i∈I1
ai = 3 + 2
∑
i∈I2
ai .
Hence, I is a solution of 〈n,m,A〉.
We finally prove:
Lemma 4.12 If 〈n,m,A〉 has a solution, then G has a V-equilibrium.
For the proof of Lemma 4.12, we shall use a particular monotonicity property of the risk
valuation R = kM with an even integer k ≥ 2. Note that
k̂M(a, b, q) = (1− q) · (a− ((1− q) · a+ q · b))k + q · (b− ((1− q) · a+ q · b))k
= (1− q) · qk · (b− a)k + q · (1− q)k · (b − a)k
= q · (1− q) · (b − a)k · (qk−1 + (1− q)k−1) .
This implies that all valuations R addressed in Theorem 4.6 incur R̂(a, b, q) which increases
monotonically in b−a for a fixed probability q ∈ (0, 1). In fact, the function R̂(a, b, q) with a ≤ b
is a function R˜(b− a, q) := R̂(a, b, q) in b− a; the function R˜(b− a, q) increases monotonically in
b−a for a fixed q ∈ (0, 1) and satisfies R˜(b−a, q) = R˜(b−a, 1−q). For the proof of Lemma 4.12,
we shall refer to these two properties together as the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property.
We continue with the proof of Lemma 4.12.
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Proof: Consider a solution I ⊂ [n] of 〈n,m,A〉. Define a mixed profile p as follows:
• For each i ∈ [n], pi(1) := 1 if i ∈ I, and 0 otherwise.
• For 1 ≤ k ≤ m: p[k,0](1), p[k,2](1) := 1; p[k,1](1), p[k,3](1) := 0; p[k,4](2) := x ∈ (0, 1).
We now prove that x can be chosen so that p is a V-equilibrium. We proceed by case analysis.
1. Players i ∈ [n] cannot improve since ω(i, π, ℓ) = 0 for all π ∈ Π and ℓ ∈ [2].
2. Consider now players [k, r] with k ∈ [m] and r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Note that for fixed k and
r, µ[k,r](s) takes only two values over all profiles s ∈ S with p(s) > 0. (Observe for this
that player π = [k, 4] is the only player with 0 < pπ(1) < 1 and ω ([k, r], π, ℓ) 6= 0 for
r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and ℓ ∈ [2].) Denote as Akr and Bkr the two values taken by µ[k,r](s) over
all profiles s ∈ S with p(s) > 0, with Akr > Bkr. By the cost functions and the definition
of p, we get:
• For r ∈ {0, 2}: Akr = 3M and Bkr = 2M , so that
E[k,r](p) = (1− x) · Akr + x · Bkr
= (3− x) ·M ,
and, using the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property,
R[k,r](p) = R̂[kr] (Akr ,Bkr , 1− x)
= R̂[kr] (3M, 2M, 1− x)
= R˜[kr] (M,x) .
• For r ∈ {1, 3}: Akr = 3 (M + 1) and Bkr = 2 (M + 1), so that
E[k,r](p) = x · Akr + (1− x) · Bkr
= (2 + x) · (M + 1) ,
and, using the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property,
R[k,r](p) = R̂[kr] (Akr ,Bkr , x)
= R̂[kr] (3 (M + 1), 2 (M + 1), x)
= R˜[kr] (M + 1, x) .
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Consider now the cost of player [k, r] with r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} when she switches to the other
link. Denote as p̂ the corresponding mixed profile. As in the case of the mixed profile p,
µ[k,r](s) takes only two values over all profiles s ∈ S with p̂(s) > 0. Denote as Ckr and
Dkr the two values taken by µ[k,r](s) over all profiles s ∈ S with p̂(s) > 0, with Ckr > Dkr.
By the cost functions and the definition of p̂, we get:
• For r ∈ {0, 2}: Ckr = 4 (M + 1) − 4 = 4M and Dkr = 3 (M + 1) − 4 = 3M − 1, so
that
E[k,r](p̂) = x · Ckr + (1− x) · Dkr
= 3M − 1 + x · (M + 1) ,
and, using the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property,
R[k,r](p̂) = R̂[kr] (Ckr,Dkr , 1− x)
= R̂[kr] (4M, 3M − 1, 1− x)
= R˜[kr] (M + 1, x) .
• For r ∈ {1, 3}: Ckr = 4M − 4 and Dkr = 3M − 4, so that
E[k,r](p̂) = x · Dkr + (1 − x) · Ckr
= 4M − 4− x ·M ,
and, using the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property,
R[k,r](p̂) = R̂[kr] (Ckr,Dkr, x)
= R̂[kr] (4M − 4, 3M − 4, x)
= R˜[kr] (M,x) .
We now determine a probability x ∈ (0, 1) so that for all players [k, r] with r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
V[k,r](p) ≤ V[k,r](p̂). We proceed by case analysis.
• For r ∈ {0, 2}: Then, V[k,r](p) ≤ V[k,r](p̂) if and only if
(3 − x) ·M + R˜[k,r](M,x) ≤ 3M − 1 + x · (M + 1) + R˜[k,r](M + 1, x)
if and only if
1 ≤ x · (2M + 1) + R˜[k,r](M + 1, x)− R˜[k,r](M,x) .
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• For r ∈ {1, 3}: Then, V[k,r](p) ≤ V[k,r](p̂) if and only if
(2 + x) · (M + 1) + R˜[k,r](M + 1, x) ≤ 4M − 4− x ·M + R˜[k,r](M,x)
if and only if
x · (2M + 1) + R˜[k,r](M + 1, x)− R˜[k,r](M,x) ≤ 2M − 6 .
Set
h(x) := x · (2M + 1) + R˜[k,r](M + 1, x)− R˜[k,r](M,x) .
We shall determine a probability x so that 1 ≤ h(x) ≤ 2M−6. (SinceM ≥ 4, 2M−6 ≥ 1.)
Observe that h(0) = 0. Set
x̂ :=
1
2M + 1
.
By the Two-Values Risk-Monotonicity property, R˜[k,r](M + 1, x) > R˜[k,r](M,x). This
implies that h(x̂) > 1. If h(x̂) ≤ 2M − 6, then set x := x̂ and we are done. If h(x̂) >
2M − 6, then the continuity of R implies that there is a probability x˜ ∈ (0, x̂) such that
1 ≤ h(x˜) ≤ 2M − 6, and we are done.
3. Finally consider players [k, 4] with k ∈ [m]. By the definition of p,
E[k,4]
(
p1[k,4],p−[k,4]
)
= 3M +
∑
i∈I aki ,
and
E[k,4]
(
p2[k,4],p−[k,4]
)
= 3 (M + 1) + 2
∑
i6∈I aki .
Since I is a solution of 〈n,m,A〉, we get that
E[k,4]
(
p1[k,4],p−[k,4]
)
= E[k,4]
(
p1[k,4],p−[k,4]
)
.
By the Risk-Positivity property, this implies that R[k,4](p) = 0 so that V[k,4](p) =
E[k,4](p). Since p is a fully mixed profile (since 0 < x < 1) and V has the Weak-
Equilibrium-for-Expectation property (Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.4), E[k,4](p) cannot
decrease; hence, neither V[k,4](p) can.
It follows from the case analysis that p is a V-equilibrium.
Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12 establish the reduction for the NP-hardness; since the numbers involved
in the reduction are polynomially bounded, strong NP-hardness follows.
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5 Two Players
Consider a concave valuation Vν , for an increasing and strictly convex function ν. Since ν−1
is also increasing, a mixed profile p is a Vν-equilibrium for a game G if and only if p is an
E-equilibrium for the game Gν constructed from G by setting for each player i ∈ [n] and profile
s ∈ S, µνi (s) := ν(µi(s)). Since every game has an E-equilibrium [24, 25], this implies that
there is a Vν-equilibrium for G, and the associated search problem for a Vν-equilibrium is
total; it is in PPAD [26] for 2-players games. Nevertheless, we shall show that there are other
(concave) valuations V for which deciding the existence of a V-equilibrium is strongly NP-hard
for 2-players games.
5.1 General NP-Hardness Result
We show:
Theorem 5.1 Fix an (E+ R)-valuation V such that:
(1) V has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
(2) There is a polynomial time computable δ with 0 < δ ≤ 14 such that:
(2/a) R̂(1, 1 + 2δ, q) < 12 for each probability q ∈ [0, 1].
(2/b) V̂(1, 1 + 2δ, r) < V̂(1, 2, q) for all 0 ≤ r ≤ q ≤ 1.
(2/c) The Crawford game GC(δ) with bimatrix
(
〈1 + δ, 1 + δ〉 〈1, 1 + 2δ〉
〈1, 1 + 2δ〉 〈1 + 2δ, 1〉
)
has no V-
equilibrium.
Then, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly NP-hard for 2-players games.
We present a general proof with a reduction involving the parameter δ from Condition (2),
required to be polynomial time computable. The reduction uses the Crawford game GC(δ) as
a “gadget”; for any δ with 0 < δ < 1, GC(δ) is an adapted generalization of a bimatrix game
from [7, Section 4]. The parameter δ enters the reduction through GC(δ).
Specifically, the proof of Theorem 5.1 employs a reduction from SAT [16, L01]. An instance
of SAT is a propositional formula φ in the form of a conjunction of clauses C = {c1, . . . , ck}
over a set of variables V = {v1, . . . , vm}. Denote as L = {ℓ1, ℓ1, . . . , ℓm, ℓm} the set of literals
corresponding to the variables in V. We shall use lower-case letters c, c1, c2, . . ., v, v1, v2, . . .,
and ℓ, ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . to denote clauses from C, variables from V and literals from L, respectively.
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Denote Λ := C ∪ V ∪ L. We shall use the Crawford set F = {f1, f2} with two strategies f1 and
f2; f denotes either f1 or f2. The cost values are chosen judiciously so as to carefully assure or
exclude the existence of a V-equilibrium. We continue with the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof: Given an instance φ of SAT, construct a game G = G(φ) = 〈[2], {Si}i∈[2], {µi}i∈[2]〉 as
follows. For each player i ∈ [2], Si := Λ ∪F . The cost functions {µi}i∈[2] are given in Figure 1.
Profile s Condition on s 〈µ1(s), µ2(s)〉
〈ℓ1, ℓ2〉 ℓ1 6= ℓ2 〈1, 1〉
〈ℓ1, ℓ2〉 ℓ1 = ℓ2 〈2, 2〉
〈ℓ, v〉 ℓ is a literal for v 〈2,m〉
〈ℓ, v〉 ℓ is not a literal for v 〈2, 0〉
〈ℓ, c〉 ℓ 6∈ c 〈2, 0〉
〈ℓ, c〉 ℓ ∈ c 〈2,m〉
〈ℓ, f〉 — 〈2, 1〉
〈v1, v2〉 or 〈c1, c2〉 or 〈v, c〉 — 〈2, 2〉
〈v, f〉 or 〈c, f〉 — 〈2, 1〉
〈f1, f1〉 — 〈1 + δ, 1 + δ〉
〈f1, f2〉 or 〈f2, f1〉 — 〈1, 1 + 2δ〉
〈f2, f2〉 — 〈1 + 2δ, 1〉
Figure 1: The cost functions for the game G(φ). For a profile 〈s1, s2〉 not in the table, set
µi(s1, s2) := µi(s2, s1), with i ∈ [2] and i 6= i; so, i is the player other than i.
For a player i ∈ [2], denote pi(F) :=
∑
f∈F pi(f), pi(L) :=
∑
ℓ∈L pi(ℓ) and pi(Λ) :=
∑
λ∈Λ pi(λ);
note that pi(F) + pi(Λ) = 1. We prove a sequence of technical claims:
Lemma 5.2 In a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 for G, p1(Λ) · p2(Λ) > 0.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that pi(Λ) = 0 for some player i ∈ [2]; so, pi(F) = 1.
For easier notation, fix i := 1. (The proof is the same for i := 2.) By Condition (2/c), the
Crawford game GC(δ) has no V-equilibrium. Hence, it follows that p2(Λ) > 0. We proceed by
case analysis on p2(F).
1. Assume first that p2(F) > 0; so, p2(Λ) < 1. Fix a strategy f ∈ F with p2(f) > 0. By the
cost functions, µ2(f
′, f) ≤ 1+ 2 δ < 2 for each strategy f ′ ∈ F . Hence, E2(p1, pf2) < 2 since
δ < 12. Fix now a strategy λ ∈ Λ with p2(λ) > 0. By the cost functions, µ2(f1, λ) = 2 for
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each strategy f1 ∈ F . Hence, E2(p1, pλ2) = 2. By the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation
property for player 2, E2(p1, p
f
2) = E2(p1, p
λ
2 ). A contradiction.
2. Assume now that p2(F) = 0; so, p2(Λ) = 1. By the cost functions, µ2 (f, λ) = 2 for each
pair of strategies f ∈ F and λ ∈ Λ. Hence, E2 (p1, p2) = 2. It follows by the Risk-Positivity
property that R2 (p1, p2) = 0, so that V2 (p1, p2) = 2. Consider now player 2 switching to
the strategy f2 ∈ F . By Condition (2/a),
R2
(
p1, p
f2
2
)
= R̂2 (1, 1 + 2 δ, p1(f1)) <
1
2
.
Thus,
E2
(
p1, p
f2
2
)
= µ2(f2, f2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
· p1(f2) + µ2(f1, f2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1+2δ
·p1(f1)
= 1 · p1(f2) + (1 + 2δ) · p1(f1)
≤ 1 + 2δ ,
so that
V2
(
p1, p
f2
2
)
= E2
(
p1, p
f2
2
)
+ R2
(
p1, p
f2
2
)
< 1 + 2δ + 12
≤ 2 (since δ ≤ 14) .
A contradiction to the assumption that 〈p1, p2〉 is a V-equilibrium.
The claim follows.
Lemma 5.3 In a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 for G, if pi(Λ) = 1 then pi(Λ) = 1.
Proof: Set i := 1 so that p1(Λ) = 1. By Lemma 5.2, p2(Λ) > 0. If p2(Λ) = 1, then we are
done. So assume p2(Λ) < 1. This implies that p2(F) > 0.
By the cost functions, for each strategy f ∈ F , µ2 (λ, f) = 1 for each strategy λ ∈ Λ. Hence,
for each strategy f ∈ F with p2(f) > 0, (i) E2
(
p1, p
f
2
)
= 1, so that the Weak-Equilibrium-
for-Expectation property for player 2 implies that E2
(
p1, p
λ
2
)
= 1 for each strategy λ ∈ Λ with
p2(λ) > 0, and (ii) R2(p1, p
f
2) = 0, by the Risk-Positivity property. Hence, V2
(
p1, p
f
2
)
= 1.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a strategy λ′ ∈ Λ with p2(λ′) > 0 such that
µ2(λ, λ
′) 6= 1 for some λ ∈ Λ with p1(λ) > 0. It follows by the Risk-Positivity property that
R2(p1, p2) > 0. Then,
V2(p1, p2) = E2(p1, p2) + R2(p1, p2)
=
∑
λ∈Λ
E2(p1, p
λ
2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
·p2(λ) +
∑
f∈F
E2(p1, p
f
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
·p2(f) + R2(p1, p2)
= 1 + R2(p1, p2) .
34
Since V2
(
p1, p
f
2
)
= 1, player 2 improves her cost by switching to a strategy f ∈ F . A contra-
diction to the assumption that 〈p1, p2〉 is a V-equilibrium.
Hence, it follows that µ2(λ, λ
′) = 1 for each pair of strategies λ, λ′ ∈ Λ with p1(λ) > 0 and
p2(λ
′) > 0. By the cost functions, it follows that for each pair of distinct strategies λ, λ′ ∈ Λ
with p1(λ) > 0 and p2(λ
′) > 0, λ, λ′ ∈ L with λ 6= λ′, µ1(λ, λ′) = 1.
Consider now player 1. Note that for each strategy λ ∈ Λ with p1(λ) > 0, (i) µ1(λ, λ′) = 1
for each strategy λ′ ∈ Λ with p2(λ′) > 0, and (ii) µ1(λ, f) = 2 for each strategy f ∈ F with
p2(f) > 0. Hence, {µ1(s) | p(s) > 0} = {1, 2}, so that V1(p1, p2) = V̂1(1, 2, q), where q = p2(F).
Consider player 1 switching to the pure strategy pf11 . By the cost functions, µ1(f1, λ) = 1
for each strategy λ ∈ Λ, µ1(f1, f2) = 1 and µ1(f1, f1) = 1 + δ. Hence, for p̂ = 〈pf11 , p2〉,
{µ1(s) | p̂(s) > 0} = {1, 1 + δ}, so that V1
(
pf11 , p2
)
= V̂1 (1, 1 + δ, r), with r = p2(f1). So,
V̂1 (1, 1 + δ, r)
< V̂1 (1, 2, q) (by Condition (2/b), since r ≤ q and 1 + δ < 2)
= V1(p1, p2) .
So, player 1 improves her cost by switching to the pure strategy pf11 . A contradiction to the
assumption that 〈p1, p2〉 is a V-equilibrium. The proof for i := 2 is identical except that in the
last stage it uses the inequality V̂2 (1, 1 + 2 δ, r) < V̂2 (1, 2, q), holding by Condition (2/b).
Lemma 5.4 In a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 for G, p1(Λ) = p2(Λ) = 1.
Proof: By Lemma 5.2, p1(Λ) > 0 and p2(Λ) > 0. If pi(Λ) = 1 for some player i ∈ [2], then, by
Lemma 5.3, pi(Λ) = 1, and we are done. So assume that p1(Λ) < 1 and p2(Λ) < 1; this implies
that p1(F) > 0 and p2(F) > 0. By the cost functions, for each pair λ, λ′ ∈ Λ,
µ1(λ, λ
′) + µ2(λ, λ
′) ≥ 2 .
So,
1
p1 (Λ) p2 (Λ)
∑
λ,λ′∈Λ
(µ1(λ, λ
′) + µ2(λ, λ
′)) p1(λ) p2(λ
′) ≥ 2 .
So, there is a player i ∈ [2] with
b :=
1
p1 (Λ) p2 (Λ)
∑
λ,λ′∈Λ
µi(λ, λ
′) p1(λ) p2(λ
′) ≥ 1 .
Without loss of generality, set i := 1. By the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for
player 1, E1
(
pλ11 , p2
)
= E1
(
pλ21 , p2
)
for all λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ with p1 (λ1) > 0 and p1 (λ2) > 0. For
λ ∈ Λ, it holds that
E1
(
pλ1 , p2
)
= 2 p2 (F) +
∑
λ′∈Λ
µ1(λ, λ
′) p2 (λ
′) .
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Hence, ∑
λ′∈Λ
µ1(λ1, λ
′) p2 (λ
′) =
∑
λ′∈Λ
µ1(λ2, λ
′) p2 (λ
′)
for all λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ with p1 (λ1) > 0 and p1 (λ2) > 0. Hence, it follows that for each λ ∈ Λ with
p1(λ) > 0, ∑
λ′∈Λ
µ1(λ, λ
′) p2 (λ
′) = b · p2 (Λ) .
So,
E1
(
pλ1 , p2
)
= 2 p2 (F) + b︸︷︷︸
≥1
·p2 (Λ) .
But for each strategy f ∈ F with p1(f) > 0,
E1
(
pf1, p2
)
= a · p2 (F) + p2 (Λ) ,
for some a with |a| < 2. Hence, the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property for player 1
implies that E1
(
pλ1 , p2
)
= E1
(
pf1, p2
)
, or
(2− a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·p2 (F) = (1− b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
·p2 (Λ) .
A contradiction.
We now establish some stronger properties for a V-equilibrium.
Lemma 5.5 Consider a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 for the game G. Then, p1(L) = p2(L) = 1, and
for every player i ∈ [2], for every literal λ ∈ L, pi(λ) · pi(λ) = 0. Moreover, E1(p1, p2) =
E2(p1, p2) = 1 and R1(p1, p2) = R2(p1, p2) = 0.
Proof: By Lemma 5.4, p1(Λ) = p2(Λ) = 1, so that p1(F) = p2(F) = 0. By the cost functions,
for each pair λ, λ ∈ Λ, µ1(λ, λ′) + µ2(λ, λ′) ≥ 2. So, E1(p1, p2) + E2(p1, p2) ≥ 2. It follows that
there is a player i ∈ [2] such that Ei(Λ,Λ) ≥ 1. For easier notation, take i := 1.
By the cost functions, for each λ ∈ Λ, µ1(f1, λ) = 1. If player 1 switches to the pure strategy
pf11 , then (i) E1(p
f1
1 , p2) = 1 ≤ E1(p1, p2), and (ii) R1(pf11 , p2) = 0, by the Risk-Positivity property.
Since R1(p1, p2) ≥ 0 (by the Risk-Positivity property), it follows that if either E1(p1, p2) > 1
or R1(p1, p2) > 0, then player 1 improves her cost by switching to p
f1
1 . Since 〈p1, p2〉 is a
V-equilibrium, it follows that both E1(p1, p2) = 1 and R1(p1, p2) = 0.
Now, E1(p1, p2) + E2(p1, p2) ≥ 2 and E1(p1, p2) = 1 together imply that E2(p1, p2) ≥ 1. In
the same way as above, E2(p1, p2) = 1 and R2(p1, p2) = 0 follow.
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By the cost functions, for each pair λ, λ′ ∈ Λ, µ1(λ, λ′) + µ1(λ, λ′) ≥ 2. We have just
shown that E1(p1, p2) + E2(p1, p2) = 2. This implies that µ1(λ, λ
′) = µ2(λ, λ
′) = 1 for each
pair λ, λ′ ∈ Λ with p1(λ) > 0 and p2(λ′) > 0. Thus, by the cost functions, λ, λ′ ∈ L, so that
p1(L) = p2(L) = 1, and pi(λ) > 0 implies that pi(λ) = 0 for all pairs of a player i ∈ [2] and a
literal λ ∈ L.
We continue to prove:
Lemma 5.6 In a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 for G, for each player i ∈ [2] and for each literal ℓ ∈ L,
pi(ℓ) + pi(ℓ) > 0.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a player i ∈ [2] and a literal ℓ ∈ L
such that pi(ℓ) = pi(ℓ) = 0. Without loss of generality, set i := 2. Recall that, by Lemma 5.5,
V1(p1, p2) = 1 and p2(L) = 1.
Consider player 1 switching to the pure strategy pv1 for the variable v such that ℓ and ℓ
are literals for v. By the cost functions, µ1 (v, λ) = m if λ ∈ {ℓ, ℓ}, and 0 if λ ∈ L \ {ℓ, ℓ}.
Since p2(L) = 1 and p2(ℓ) = p2(ℓ) = 0, it follows that µ1 (v, λ) = 0 for all strategies λ with
p2(λ) > 0. Thus, (i) E1 (p
v
1, p2) = 0, and (ii) R1 (p
v
1, p2) = 0 (by the Risk-Positivity property).
Hence, V1 (p
v
1, p2) = 0, so that player 1 improves her cost by switching to the pure strategy p
v
1.
A contradiction to the assumption that 〈p1, p2〉 is a V-equilibrium.
Finally, we prove:
Lemma 5.7 A V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉 for G induces a unique truth assignment for φ.
Proof: For each pair of a player i ∈ [2] and a literal ℓ ∈ L, it holds that (i) p1(ℓ) + p1(ℓ) > 0
(by Lemma 5.6), and (ii) if pi(ℓ) > 0, then pi(ℓ) = 0 (by Lemma 5.5). Thus, for each variable
v, there is a literal ℓ for v such that p1(ℓ), p2(ℓ) > 0 and p1(ℓ) = p2(ℓ) = 0.
We are now ready to prove:
Lemma 5.8 φ is satisfiable if and only if G(φ) has a V-equilibrium.
Proof: “⇐:” Assume first that φ is not satisfiable. Assume, by way of contradiction, that
G(φ) has a V-equilibrium 〈p1, p2〉. By Lemma 5.7, 〈p1, p2〉 induces a unique truth assignment γ
for φ. Since φ is not satisfiable, there is a clause c such that for each literal ℓ with p1(ℓ), p2(ℓ) > 0,
ℓ 6∈ c. Consider now player 1 switching to the pure strategy pc1. Then,
E1 (p
c
1, p2) =
∑
ℓ∈L|p2(ℓ)>0
µ1(c, ℓ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
·p2(ℓ) = 0 ,
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and R1 (p
c
1, p2) = 0 (by the Risk-Positivity property), so that V1 (p
c
1, p2) = 0. By Lemma 5.5,
V1(p1, p2) = 1. So, player 1 improves her cost by switching to the pure strategy p
c
1. A contra-
diction to the assumption that 〈p1, p2〉 is a V-equilibrium.
“⇒:” Assume now that φ is satisfiable. For a satisfying assignment γ of φ, set pi(ℓ) := 1m
for each literal ℓ ∈ L with γ(ℓ) = 1. We shall prove that 〈p1, p2〉 is a V-equilibrium. Fix a player
i ∈ [2]. By the cost functions, µi(ℓj, ℓk) = 1 for each pair of literals ℓj, ℓk with p1(ℓj) ·p2(ℓk) > 0.
Hence, the Risk-Positivity property implies that Ri(p1, p2) = 0. Furthermore,
Ei(p1, p2) =
∑
〈ℓj ,ℓk〉∈L|γ(ℓj)=γ(ℓk)=1
µi(ℓj , ℓk) p1(ℓj) · p2(ℓk) = m2 · 1 · 1
m
· 1
m
= 1 .
So, player i may decrease Vi only if she decreases Ei. It suffices to prove that player i cannot
decrease Ei by switching to a pure strategy. We proceed by case analysis.
1. Consider player i switching to the pure strategy pv1 for a variable v ∈ V with literals ℓ, ℓ.
By the cost functions, for each literal λ ∈ L, µi (v, λ) = m if λ ∈ {ℓ, ℓ} and 0 otherwise.
By construction, pi(ℓ) + pi(ℓ) =
1
m . So,
Ei (p
v
i , pi) = 0 ·
(
1− 1
m
)
+m · 1
m
= 1 .
2. Consider player i switching to the pure strategy pci for a clause c ∈ C. By the cost
functions, for each literal λ ∈ L, µi (c, λ) = m if λ ∈ c and 0 otherwise. Since φ is
satisfiable, there is at least one literal ℓ ∈ c with γ(ℓ) = 1; hence, by construction of pi,
there is at least one literal ℓ ∈ c with pi(ℓ) = 1m . Thus,
Ei (p
c
i , pi) =
∑
ℓ∈c|pi(ℓ)>0
µi (c, ℓ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=m
·pi(ℓ) ≥ m ·
1
m
= 1 .
3. Consider player i switching to the pure strategy pfi for some f ∈ F . By construction of
the cost functions, for each literal λ ∈ L, µi (f, ℓ) = 1. It follows that Ei
(
pfi, pi
)
= 1.
4. Finally, consider player i switching to the pure strategy pℓi for some literal ℓ ∈ L. Assume
first that γ(ℓ) = 1. Then, pi(ℓ) = 0. Hence, by the cost functions, µi(ℓ, ℓ
′) = 1 for each
literal ℓ′ ∈ L with pi(ℓ) > 0. It follows that Ei
(
pℓi , pi
)
= 1. Assume now that γ(ℓ) = 0.
Then, pi(ℓ) =
1
m . By the cost functions, µi(ℓ, ℓ) = 2 and µi(ℓ, ℓ
′) = 1 for ℓ′ ∈ L \ {ℓ} with
pi(ℓ
′) > 0. It follows that
Ei
(
pℓi , pi
)
= 2 · 1
m
+ 1 ·
(
1− 1
m
)
= 1+
1
m
.
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The claim now follows.
Lemma 5.8 establishes the reduction for the NP-hardness; since the numbers involved in the
reduction are polynomially bounded, strong NP-hardness follows.
5.2 Concrete NP-Hardness Result
We remark that the proof of the reduction for Theorem 5.1 is modular in treating V in an
abstract way through using Risk-Positivity, Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation, and the proper-
ties in Condition (2). This modularity yields an extension of Theorem 5.1 to concrete (E+ R)-
valuations enjoying these properties. We shall verify Conditions (1) and (2) from Theorem 5.1
for the (E + R)-valuations V, where (1) R = γ · Var, or (2) R = γ · SD, or a valuation (3)
V = λ (E+ γ · Var) + (1− λ)Vν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν(x) = xr, with r ≥ 2, and with γ > 0.
The Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property in Condition (1) follows from Corollary 3.3.
For Condition (2), we shall prove three technical claims associated with Conditions (2/a), (2/b)
and (2/c), respectively. We start with Condition (2/a). We remark that the existence of a δ
such that R̂(1, 1 + 2δ, q) < 12 for each probability q ∈ [0, 1] follows already from the continuity
of R; but its polynomial time computation is bound to depend on each particular R̂. We prove:
Lemma 5.9 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where (1) R = γ · Var, or (2) R = γ · SD, or (3)
V = λ (E + γ · Var) + (1 − λ)Vν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν(x) = xr with r ≥ 2, and with γ > 0.
Then, there is a polynomial time computable ∆ with 0 < ∆ ≤ 14 such that R̂(1, 1 + 2δ, q) < 12
for all q ∈ [0, 1] and 0 ≤ δ < ∆.
Proof: For each valuation V, we shall choose a suitable ∆.
(1) R = γ · Var: Then, γ · R̂ (1, 1 + 2δ, q) = γ · q(1 − q) · 4δ2 ≤ γ · 14 · 4δ2 = γ · δ2. Choose ∆
as a rational number no larger than 14 ·min
{
1√
γ
, 1
}
. This choice satisfies that for each
δ < ∆, γ · δ2 < 12.
(2) R = γ · SD: Then, γ · R̂ (1, 1 + 2δ, q) = γ ·√q(1− q) · 2δ ≤ γ · 12 · 2δ = γ · δ. Choose
∆ := 14 ·min
{
1
γ , 1
}
. This choice satisfies that for each δ < ∆, γ · δ < 12.
(3) V = λ(E+ γ · Var) + (1− λ)Vν where ν(x) = xr with r ≥ 2:
Consider first the risk valuation R = Vν − E, where ν(x) = xr with r ≥ 2. Note that
R̂ (1, 1 + 2δ, q) = r
√
q · (1 + 2δ))r + (1− q)− 1− q · (2δ) .
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Set ∆ := 14. Then, for every δ < ∆, the fact that R̂ (1, 1 + 2δ, q) increases monotonically
in δ implies that
R̂ (1, 1 + 2δ, q) ≤ r
√
1 + q ·
((
3
2
)r
− 1
)
− 1− q · 1
2
;
for q = 0, r
√
1 + 0 ·
((
3
2
)r
− 1
)
− 1− 0 · 12 = 0 < 12. So assume that q > 0. Then, by the
fact that r
√
1 + q ·
((
3
2
)r
− 1
)
increases monotonically in q and 0 < q ≤ 1, we get that
R̂ (1, 1 + 2δ, q) ≤ 32 − 1− q · 12 = 12 − q · 12 < 12 since q > 0.
Combined with the choice of ∆ for (1), the required property for the convex combination
V = λ(E + γ · Var) + (1 − λ)Vν , where ν(x) = xr with r ≥ 2, holds by choosing ∆ as a
rational number no larger than min
{
1
4 ·min
{
1√
γ
, 1
}
, 14
}
= 14 ·min
{
1√
γ
, 1
}
.
We continue with Condition (2/b). We prove:
Lemma 5.10 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where (1) R = γ · Var, or (2) R = γ · SD, or (3)
V = λ (E + γ · Var) + (1 − λ)Vν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν is increasing and strictly convex,
and with γ > 0. Then, there is a polynomial time computable ∆ with 0 < ∆ ≤ 14 such that
V̂(1, 1 + 2δ, r) < V̂(1, 2, q) for all q ∈ (0, 1), with 0 ≤ r ≤ q, and 0 ≤ δ < ∆.
Proof: For each valuation V, we shall choose a suitable ∆.
Case (1): R = γ · Var: Note that
V̂(1, 1 + 2δ, r) = (1 + 2δ) · r + 1 · (1− r) + γ · r(1 − r) · 4δ2
= 2δ · r + 1 + γ · r(1 − r) · 4δ2 ,
and
V̂(1, 2, q) = 2 · q + 1 · (1 − q) + γ · q(1− q)
= q + 1 + γ · q(1− q) .
Note also that
max
0≤r≤q
r(1 − r) =
{
1
4 , if q ≥ 12
q(1− q) , otherwise .
If q ≤ 12, then r(1 − r) ≤ q(1 − q). Choosing ∆ := 14, this implies immediately that V̂(1, 1 +
2δ, r) < V̂(1, 2, q) for 0 ≤ δ < ∆. Consider now q > 12 and set ∆ := min
{
1
4 ,
1
2(1 + γ)
}
. Denote
A := 1 + δ(2q + γ). Then, for δ < ∆,
V̂(1, 1 + 2δ, r) ≤ 2δ · q + 1 + γ · δ2 < A ,
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while
A
< 1 +∆ · (2q + γ) (since δ < ∆)
= 1 +
2q + γ
2(1 + γ)
< 1 +
2q(1 + γ)
2(1 + γ)
(since q > 12)
= 1 + q
< V̂(1, 2, q) .
Case (2): R = γ · SD: Then,
V̂(1, 1 + 2δ, r) = 2δ · r + 1 + γ ·
√
r(1 − r) · 2δ ,
and
V̂(1, 2, q) = q + 1 + γ ·
√
q(1− q) .
For q ≤ 12, the argument is identical to the one for Case (1). Consider now q > 12, and set
again ∆ := min
{
1
4 ,
1
2(1 + γ)
}
. Denote again A := 1 + δ(2q + γ). By arguments identical to
those for Case (1), we derive that V̂(1, 1 + 2δ, r) < A and A ≤ q + 1 < V̂(1, 2, q).
Case (3): V = λ · (E+ γ · Var) + (1− λ) · Vν , ν increasing and strictly convex.
Consider first the valuation V = Vν . Note that
V̂ν(1, 1 + 2δ, r) = ν−1 (ν(1) · (1 − r) + ν(1 + 2δ) · r) ,
and
V̂ν(1, 2, q) = ν−1 (ν(1) · (1− q) + ν(2) · q) .
Thus,
V̂ν(1, 1 + 2δ, r) < V̂ν(1, 2, q)
if and only if
r · (ν(1 + 2δ)− ν(1)) < q · (ν(2)− ν(1)) .
Set ∆ := 14. Since r ≤ q, ν is strictly increasing and 1 + 2δ < 2 for δ < ∆, the last inequality
holds, and we are done.
Combined with the choice of ∆ for (1), the required property for the convex combination
V = λ · (E+ γ · Var) + (1− λ) · Vν , where ν is increasing and strictly convex, holds by choosing
∆ := min
{
min
{
1
4 ,
1
γ
}
, 14
}
= min
{
1
4 ,
1
γ
}
.
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Last, for Condition (2/c), we use the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property to prove:
Lemma 5.11 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where (1) R = γ · Var, or (2) R = γ · SD, or (3)
V = λ (E+ γ · Var) + (1− λ)Vν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν is increasing and strictly convex, and
with γ > 0. Then, for any δ, 0 < δ < 1, the Crawford game GC(δ) has no V-equilibrium.
Proof: GC(δ) has no pure equilibrium due to the following cycle of improvement steps:
(f1, f1)
1−→ (f2, f1) 2−→ (f2, f2) 1−→ (f1, f2) 2−→ (f1, f1)
〈1 + δ, 1 + δ〉 〈1, 1 + 2 δ〉 〈1 + 2 δ, 1〉 〈1 + δ, 1 + δ〉
Assume, by way of contradiction, that GC(δ) has a mixed V-equilibrium p. Denote p1 :=
〈x, 1− x〉 and p2 := 〈y, 1 − y〉. Note that
E1
(
pf11 , p2
)
= y · (1 + δ) + (1 − y) · 1 = 1 + y · δ ,
and
E1
(
pf21 , p2
)
= y · 1(1 + δ) + (1− y) · (1 + δ) = 1 + 2δ − 2y · δ .
By the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property,
E1
(
〈pf11 , p2〉
)
= E1
(
〈pf21 , p2〉
)
,
or 1 + y · δ = 1 + 2δ − 2y · δ, yielding y = 23. So, p2 =
〈
2
3 ,
1
3
〉
.
Case (3): Clearly,
E1(p) = E1
(
〈pf11 , p2〉
)
=
1
3
· (3 + 2δ) ,
Var1(p) = x · 2
3
· (1 + δ)2 + x · 1
3
· 12 + (1− x) · 2
3
· 12 + (1− x) · 1
3
· (1 + 2δ)2 −
(
1
3
· (3 + 2δ)
)2
=
2δ2
3
·
(
4
3
− x
)
,
and
Vν1 (p) = ν
−1
(
x · 2
3
· ν(1 + δ) + (1− x) · 1
3
· ν(1) + x · 2
3
· ν(1) + (1− x) · 1
3
· ν(1 + 2δ)
)
,
so that
V1(p)
= λ · (E1(p) + γ · Var1(p)) + (1− λ) · Vν1 (p)
= λ ·
(
1
3
· (3 + 2δ) + γ · 2δ
2
3
·
(
4
3
− x
))
+ (1− λ) ·
·ν−1
(
x · 2
3
· ν(1 + δ) + (1− x) · 1
3
· ν(1) + x · 2
3
· ν(1) + (1− x) · 1
3
· ν(1 + 2δ)
)
.
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Since (i) p1 is a V1-best-response to p2 and (ii) V1 is concave in the mixed strategy p1, the
Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) implies that there is a constant A such that V1(p) = A
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Since δ 6= 0, this yields a contradiction for λ = 1. So assume 0 < λ < 1. Then,
for all x ∈ [0, 1],
A
= λ ·
(
1
3
· (3 + 2δ) + γ · 2δ
2
3
·
(
4
3
− x
))
+ (1− λ) ·
·ν−1
(
x · 2
3
· ν(1 + δ) + (1− x) · 1
3
· ν(1) + x · 2
3
· ν(1) + (1− x) · 1
3
· ν(1 + 2δ)
)
.
Rearranging yields ν(c1 + d1x) = c2 + d2x, for some constants c1, d1, c2 and d2 with d1 :=
λ
λ− 1 ·
2 δ2
3 6= 0, for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
ν(x) = c2 − c1 · d2
d1
+
d2
d1
· x
for all x ∈ [0, 1], so that ν is not strictly convex. A contradiction.
Case (1): This is the special case of Case (3) with λ = 1.
Case (2): Note that
(E1 + γ · SD1) (p) = 1
3
· (3 + 2δ) + γ · δ ·
√
2
3
·
(
4
3
− x
)
.
Since (i) p1 is a (E1+ γ ·SD1)-best-response to p2 and (ii) E1+ γ ·SD1 is concave in the mixed
strategy p1, the Optimal-Value property (Proposition 3.1) implies that there is a constant A
such that (E1 + γ · SD1)(p) = A for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Since δ 6= 0, this yields a contradiction.
Now, for Condition (2) in Theorem 5.1, choose δ as a rational number no larger than the
minimum of the ∆ from Lemma 5.9 and the ∆ from Lemma 5.10, both of which are polynomial
time computable for the (E + R)-valuations in Theorem 5.12. This choice guarantees that all
Conditions (2/a), (2/b) and (2/c) in Theorem 5.1 are satisfied by the chosen δ. Hence, it
follows:
Theorem 5.12 Fix an (E + R)-valuation V, where (1) R = γ · Var, or (2) R = γ · SD, or (3)
V = λ (E + γ · Var) + (1 − λ)Vν , with 0 < λ ≤ 1, where ν(x) = xr with r ≥ 2, and with γ > 0.
Then, ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM is strongly NP-hard for 2-players games.
6 Epilogue
We embarked on a research direction making different-from-classical assumptions on the be-
havior of the players in order to model the real-world in a more accurate way and gain insights
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that explain reality better. We have developed a framework for games with players minimiz-
ing an (E + R)-valuation V. Our framework enabled proving the strong NP-hardness of ∃V-
EQUILIBRIUM in the simplest cases of games with two strategies or two players, respectively,
and for many significant choices of (E+ R)-valuations V.
Besides these central results, our study is making a number of additional conceptual and
technical contributions through introducing several new analytical and combinatorial tools and
techniques, which are of wider applicability and interest; we summarize here the main ones.
• Our proof techniques have relied heavily on the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation prop-
erty, which indicates its computational power.
• We introduced E-strict concavity as the most general known class of valuations with the
Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property.
• We imported ν-valuations from Actuarial Risk Theory [18] into the realm of equilibrium
computation and revealed some of their algorithmic properties; ditto for higher moments,
generalizing the variance considered before in [12, 22], which were used before as risk-
modeling valuations in Portfolio Theory [19].
• We established the Mixed-Player-Has-Pure-Neighbors property, which explicitly identi-
fies a class of games and a corresponding class of valuations where mixed equilibria get
“endangered” (cf. [7, 12]).
Our work opens up a wide avenue for future research towards revealing the complexity of
∃V-EQUILIBRIUM for other valuations V. Most obviously, the modularity of the proof of The-
orem 5.1 may allow, similarly to Theorem 5.12, direct derivation of new concrete complexity
results for other valuations that will be shown to have the assumed properties. Enhancing
the class of E-strictly concave valuations may yield such new valuations, which may be di-
rectly accomodated into the general framework we developed. But new tools and techniques
may be required for settling the complexity of ∃V-EQUILIBRIUM when V is not concave or
not E-strictly concave, or when it lacks the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property. It is
not clear whether and how our framework could be extended to accomodate even quasiconcave
valuations. We conclude with such an example, cast into the context of maximization games.
The Sharpe ratio valuation, formulated as SR = E
1 + SD
[27], is the ratio of a convex over a
concave function; although it is not convex, it is quasiconvex as shown in [29]. Does SR have the
Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property? What is the complexity of ∃SR-EQUILIBRIUM?
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A FP-Strict Concavity
We recall the following definition from [12, Section 2], rendering their notation and vocabulary.
Definition A.1 (FP-Strict Convexity) Fix a player i ∈ [n]. The valuation Vi is FP-strictly
convex if for any fixed partial mixed profile x−i, for any pair of payoff distributions Pi(x
′
i,x−i) 6=
Pi(x
′′
i ,x−i), where x
′
i and x
′′
i are mixed strategies, and for any α with 0 < α < 1, it holds that
Vi
(
αx′i + (1− α)x′′i ,x−i
)
< αVi
(
x′i,x−i
)
+ (1− α)Vi
(
x′′i ,x−i
)
.
We quote from [12, Section 2] that the payoff distribution Pi = Pi(p) is the probability dis-
tribution induced from a mixed profile p on the range of possible payoffs for player i over all
profiles; so, the probability that player i receives payoff a is
∑
s∈S|µi(s)=a
p(s). Recall also that
Vi is FP-strictly concave if −Vi is FP-strictly convex. We observe:
Observation A.1 The valuation V = E− Var is not FP-strictly convex.
Proof: By counterexample. Consider the game G with two players 1 and 2, with S1 = {s1, s2}
and S2 = {t1, t2, t3, t4}. The utilities for player 1 are given by
p1(s1, tj) =

9
2 , if j = 1
7
2 , if j = 2
0 , if j ∈ {3, 4}
,
and
p1(s2, tj) =

0 , if j ∈ {1, 2}
5 , if j = 3
15
4 , if j = 4
.
Player 2 has chosen the mixed strategy x2 =
〈
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
10 ,
2
5
〉
. For player 1, x′1 is the pure strategy
s1; x
′′
1 is the pure strategy s2. Then, clearly, the induced payoff distributions P1(x
′
1, x2) and
P1(x
′′
1, x2) are different.
Note that for every mixed strategy x1 of player 1,
V1(x1, x2) = E1(x1, x2)− Var1(x1, x2)
= E1(x1, x2)− Ê1(x1, x2) + (E1(x1, x2))2 ,
i
where Ê1 denotes the expectation for the square game G
2 (where the utilities are the squares
of the utilities for G). It is
E1(x
′
1, x2) =
1
4
· 9
2
+
1
4
· 7
2
= 2 ,
E1(x
′′
1 , x2) =
1
10
· 5 + 2
5
· 15
4
= 2 ,
and
Ê1(x
′
1, x2) =
1
4
·
(
9
2
)2
+
1
4
·
(
7
2
)2
= 8 +
1
8
,
Ê1(x
′′
1 , x2) =
1
10
· 52 + 2
5
·
(
15
4
)2
= 8 +
1
8
.
Thus,
V1(x
′
1, x2) = V1(x
′′
1, x2) .
Now, set x1 = αx
′
1 + (1− α)x′′1 , where 0 < α < 1. By linearity of expectation,
E1(x1, x2) = E1(x
′
1, x2) = E1(x
′′
1, x2)
and
Ê1(x1, x2) = Ê1(x
′
1, x2) = Ê1(x
′′
1 , x2) .
Hence,
V1(x1, x2) = V1(x
′
1, x2) = V1(x
′′
1 , x2) .
So, V1 is not FP-strictly convex.
ii
